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Non-Parties:
The Negative Externalities of Regional Trade
Agreements in a Private Law Perspective
Daniela Caruso*
In private law theory and in international trade law alike, a new strand of scholarship has emerged in
recent years. This strand is characterized by a focus on market actors who are excluded from deals struck
by other parties and suffer economic hardship as a result. Scholars have also focused on doctrines and legal
concepts apt to identify this type of hardship and to provide non-parties with justiciable claims and
remedies. Private-law and trade-law scholars involved in this mode of research are often moved by justice
concerns and by the realization that rules based solely on the enforcement of bilateral deals may be
structurally antithetical to a progressive distribution of resources. Towards the goal of contributing to this
literature, I draw inspiration and materials from comparative private-law theory. I then review a range
of private law doctrines designed to protect non-parties from the negative externalities of discrete agreements
and show how the use of private law analogies in the context of trade theory yields both analytical pay-
offs and normative caveats. I conclude that the ongoing attempts to identify, within the framework of
international trade law, actionable remedies in favor of non-parties to trade agreements are analytically
helpful, but remain distributionally ambivalent and need stronger normative vectors.
Introduction
In the law of contracts as in the law of international treaties, much de-
pends on the maxim “pacta tertiis nec nocent nec prosunt”: covenants between
two parties neither hurt nor benefit third parties. In a variety of legal dis-
putes between individuals as well as among sovereign states, the “pacta ter-
tiis” refrain routinely leads adjudicating bodies to conclude that only the
parties to an agreement have cause and standing to litigate any aspect of it.1
The private law doctrine of contractual privity is a direct application of that
maxim, and the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties codifies it in
Article 34 as a “general rule.”2 But one need only scratch the surface of legal
* Professor of Law and Jean Monnet Chair, Boston University School of Law. Thanks to Marija Bartl,
Anna di Robilant, Bianca Gardella Tedeschi, Wendy Gordon, Duncan Kennedy, Fernanda Nicola,
Thomas Streinz, and Chantal Thomas for comments on prior drafts, and to Shaelyn Gambino-Morrison
and Naveed Ghasem for excellent research assistance. This Article has also benefited greatly from com-
ments received at the University of Amsterdam during the conference “European Private Law at a Time
of Growing Inequality” of September 30, 2016 and at Boston University School of Law during the
conference “Trade Law in the Trump Era: A Transatlantic Perspective” of September 8–9, 2017 (co-
funded by the Erasmus+ Programme of the European Union). Errors are mine.
1. E. Allan Farnsworth, Contracts 652 (4th ed. 2004) (“The performance of a contract usually
benefits persons other than the parties who made it, but they cannot ordinarily enforce it.”).
2. Article 34 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties recites: “General Rule Regarding
Third States. A treaty does not create either obligations or rights for a third State without its consent.”
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enunciation to realize that the maxim is misleading both in fact and at law:
normally, contracts and trade agreements generate abundant externalities
and, across legal systems, plenty of avenues exist towards the recognition of
third parties’ claims. The “general rule” is really not that general.
As a matter of fact, the market value of individually owned assets is obvi-
ously affected by deals struck by other parties and by the impact of such
deals on relevant competitive structures. Likewise, in the parallel context of
international trade, preferential agreements concluded among some states
alter, by definition, the flow of trade to and from non-party nations.3 Such
externalities may very well be positive. For instance, Switzerland, which has
not been privy to the negotiations towards a Transatlantic Trade and Invest-
ment Partnership (“TTIP”), might stand to benefit from a deeper integra-
tion of U.S. and EU markets.4 If the United States and the European Union
were to agree on mutual recognition of their regulatory standards in any
given sector of production, Swiss exporters could opt to comply with the less
stringent standard while retaining access to the entire TTIP market.5 But
the externalities of contracts and trade deals may just as well be negative.
Each sale of goods—a contract between a given seller and her customers—
takes wealth away from that seller’s competitors.6 The same is true for pref-
erential trade agreements (“PTAs”), which normally divert trade away from
other countries.7 At times damaged third parties are easy to identify, but
more often the damage does not even appear on the contracting parties’
radar screen. Third parties then become “non-parties” and as such are rou-
tinely excluded from any stage of negotiation, implementation or enforce-
ment of deals struck by others.
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 34, May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331. See Malgosia
Fitzmaurice, Third Parties and the Law of Treaties, [2002] 6 Max Planck United Nations Y.B. 37, 38.
3. Joost Pauwelyn, Not As Preferential As You May Think: How Mega-Regionals Can Benefit Third Coun-
tries, in Mega-Regional Trade Agreements 61, 62 (T. Rensmann ed., 2017). The trade agreements
considered in this Article can involve either unilateral or reciprocal trade concessions between participat-
ing countries. In either case, the level of market access between the participating countries is by hypothe-
sis deeper than it is at the multilateral WTO level, and is therefore preferential vis-a`-vis the baseline
Most-Favored-Nation regime. Preferential Trade Agreements (“PTAs”) may encompass just two states,
or have a large regional dimension, in which case they are referred to as Regional Trade Agreements
(“RTAs”) in this Article. Free Trade Areas (“FTAs”) like NAFTA or Customs Unions like the European
Union are common forms of PTAs. In international trade literature the acronyms PTA and RTA often
overlap. See Michael Trebilcock, Robert Howse & Antonia Eliason, The Regulation of In-
ternational Trade 83 (4th ed. 2013).
4. Pauwelyn, supra note 3, at 63. R
5. The Trump Administration has officially pulled out of talks concerning the Trans-Pacific Partner-
ship (“TPP”), but it has never formally abandoned TTIP negotiations. See Richard Bravo & Julia Chat-
terley, Trump Is Willing to Reopen TTIP Amid EU-U.S. Trade Dispute, Ross Says, Bloomberg (Mar. 29,
2018, 10:30 AM), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2018-03-29/trump-willing-to-reopen-ttip-
amid-eu-u-s-trade-spat-ross-says.
6. The opening of a competing shop famously hurt a village barber’s business and became a canonical
example of unfair competition in U.S. legal scholarship. Tuttle v. Buck, 119 N.W. 946 (Minn. 1909); see
Zechariah Chafee, Jr., Unfair Competition, 53 Harv. L. Rev. 1289, 1304 (1940).
7. The conceptualization of trade diversion is conventionally attributed to Jacob Viner, The Cus-
toms Union Issue (1950).
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Given the difficulty of assessing, ex ante or even ex post, the balance of
positive and negative externalities of international trade agreements,8 some
scholars see no point in worrying about the fate of non-parties,9 or remain
cautiously optimistic.10 Others, however, fret.11 Foremost among the con-
cerned are jurists and economists who focus on the Global South.12 Unlike
Switzerland and many other advanced economies, developing countries have
much skin in the game of regional trade agreements (“RTAs”) concluded by
other nations and many reasons to worry about their implementation.
Quarters of the globe such as sub-Saharan Africa, where most of the world’s
poorest states happen to be located,13 may suffer particularly detrimental
8. Quantification of trade diversion is notoriously difficult. See Chris Brummer, Minilateralism:
How Trade Alliances, Soft Law and Financial Engineering are Redefining Economic
Statecraft 72 (2014).
9. Pauwelyn, supra note 3, at 70. R
10. Peter Draper et al., Can Rules of Origin in Sub-Saharan Africa Be Harmonized?,
(German Dev. Inst. Discussion Paper 1/2016), www.die-gdi.de/uploads/media/DP_1.2016.pdf (noting
that African countries could possibly benefit from a new TTIP-based regime if this included such fea-
tures as mutual recognition of standards and streamlined rules of origin); see also Peter Draper & Salim
Ismail, The Potential Impact of Mega-regionals on Sub-Saharan Africa and LDCs in the Region, in World
Economic Forum, Mega-regional Trade Agreements: Game-Changers or Costly Distrac-
tions for the World Trading System? 30, 30–31 (2014) (“[T]he ability of African nations to diver-
sify market opportunities, integrate their economies in global value chains and attract sustainable
investment could be affected. The long-term balance of benefits against risks will depend on the design
of these agreements, supportive international policies and the strategic response of African policy-makers
and firms.”). A sustainability impact assessment, recently made public by the EU Commission, con-
cludes that the TTIP could benefit least developing countries thanks to positive spill-over effects, but
only if the European Union and the United States do not “turn TTIP into a transatlantic fortress with
substantial RoO provisions [and] MRAs that only apply to EU and US firms,” and if the TTIP remains
open to countries who later want to join. Stephanie Bouman et al., Ecorys, SIA in Support of the Negotia-
tions on a Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP), at 171 (2017), http://trade.ec.europa.eu/
doclib/docs/2017/april/tradoc_155464.pdf.
11. See, e.g., Meredith Kolsky Lewis, The Politics and Indirect Effects of Asymmetrical Bargaining Power in
Free Trade Agreements, in The Politics of International Economic Law 19, 21 (Tomer Broude et al.
eds., 2011) (“FTAs can have a further negative effect of constraining the future policy choices of [non-
parties].”); Dan Ciuriak, Mega Regionals and the Developing Countries, Comments at the Trade Workshop,
Centre for Global Development and the International Institute for Sustainable Development (June 24,
2014) (“[M]ega-regionals impose trade diversion costs on non-participants, which cumulatively start to
look quite significant.”); Amy Wood, Beyond 2015: Trade Reform and the Development Deficit (Academics
Stand Against Poverty, Draft Paper, 2015) (positing that megaregionals such as the TTIP would “under-
mine development priorities, leaving developing countries with a narrow set of options and little time to
respond with appropriate economic and political measures”); Bernhard Zeilinger, Post-Doha Reorganisation
of Global Trade at the Expense of the Global South, 32 Journal fu¨r Entwicklungspolitik 16, 19 (2016)
(concluding that “Countries of the Global South will be in an even weaker bargaining position as negoti-
ations take place outside of the multilateral decision making process” and that “bilateral trade agree-
ments will drive a wedge between recently arising South-South coalitions”).
12. I borrow the label “Global South” from current literature to refer collectively to the least develop-
ing countries in the world. See, e.g., Paulos Milkias, Developing the Global South: A United
Nations Prescription for the Third Millennium (2010); Jan Grumiller, Werner Raza & Bernhard
Tro¨ster, The EU Trade Regime and the Global South, 32 Journal fu¨r Enwicklungspolitik 4 (2016) (in
the international trade context).
13. See Paul Collier, The Bottom Billion: Why the Poorest Countries are Failing and
What Can Be Done About It 3 (2007).
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effects as a result of such gigantic RTAs as the proposed TTIP.14 New Euro-
pean preferences extended to U.S. exports are likely to offset existing prefer-
ences in favor of African products.15 Revised rules of origin and higher non-
tariff barriers resulting from transatlantic regulatory cooperation may fur-
ther compound the problem.16 Yet, African countries’ interests have hardly
been represented during the TTIP negotiations.17 Should the U.S.–EU deal,
now on the backburner, be revamped, non-parties would have to brace
themselves for its possibly harmful consequences. This predicament is any-
thing but marginal. In fact, the harm to non-parties may become even more
significant if the current trend towards large RTAs—in trade jargon
“megaregionals”—is replaced by a network of smaller, strategic bilateral
14. The proposed TTIP, an especially large trade agreement pursuing an especially deep level of
economic integration between the EU and the United States, is commonly dubbed a “megaregional.” See,
e.g., Ricardo Mele´ndez-Ortiz, Mega-regionals: What Is Going on?, in World Economic Forum, Mega-
regional Trade Agreements, supra note 10, at 14 (defining the TTIP a “megaregional” and “a R
potential new pillar of trade governance, complementary to the multilateral trade system” on the basis of
the following characteristics:
[T]he agreement would affect a share of at least a quarter of world trade in goods and services
and of global FDI; at least two economies party to the agreement are hubs in global value
chains (“GVCs”) as evidenced by their share of trade intermediate goods and tasks in the
regions involved; the agreement’s coverage goes deeper and beyond the WTO, RTAs and
bilateral investment treaties (“BITs”), addressing a minimum of areas and regulatory reform
essential to 21st century world markets; and parties to the agreement are engaged in multiple
RTAs with third party economies and enjoy extensive trade and investment exchange with a
significant number of non-members, making the partnership a potential reverse trade-diver-
sion scheme.).
15. Trade diversion away from African exports and in favor of U.S. products or services could result
from the erosion of trade preferences previously extended by the EU to African nations. U.S. citrus fruit
exports, for example, are likely to increase at the expense of exports from South Africa, Egypt, and
Morocco. See Zeilinger, supra note 11, at 32 (referring to a study by Rainer Falk & Barbara Unmu¨ßig, The R
Great Revenge of the North? TTIP and the Rest of the World, Heinrick-Bo¨ll-Stiftung (March 3, 2014),
https://us.boell.org/2014/03/03/great-revenge-north-ttip-and-rest-world); see also Elwyn Davies & Lars
Nilsson, A Comparative Analysis of EU and US Trade Preferences for the LDCs and the AGOA Beneficiaries,
at 10–12 http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2013/february/tradoc_150479.%201_February%202013
.pdf; Eveline Herfkens, TTIP and Sub-Saharan Africa: A Proposal to Harmonize EU and U.S. Preferences, in
The Geopolitics of TTIP: Repositioning the Transatlantic Relationship for a Changing
World 151, 152 (2014) (“Poor non-members, currently enjoying preferences, see their preferential mar-
gins erode, as overall levels of protection are reduced.”).
16. See, e.g., Reeve T. Bull et al., New Approaches to International Regulatory Cooperation: The Challenge of
TTIP, TPP, and Mega-Regional Trade Agreements, 78 L. & Contemp. Probs. 1, 18 (2015) (“[R]egulatory
standards and measures adopted through TTIP could threaten some countries with competitive disadvan-
tage or otherwise adversely affect them.”).
17. Important interventions like those mentioned in Paul Mertensko¨tter & Thomas Streinz,
Third-Party Effects of Transatlantic Regulatory Coordination (2017), http://www.iilj.org/
wp-content/uploads/2017/08/TTIP-Stakeholder-Presentation-final-1.pdf, are by no means common. See
Ciuriak, supra note 11 (“[T]here is little scope for [non-participants] to mitigate the shocks.”); Jan R
Klabbers, Megaregionals: Protecting Third Parties? (N.Y.U. Inst. for Int’l L. & Just., 2016)
(“[I]t seems that the megaregionals themselves pay rather little attention to their relationship to other
agreements.”); Peter Draper et al., Mega-Regional Trade Agreements: Implications for the
African, Caribbean, and Pacific Countries (Eur. Ctr. for Int’l Pol. Econ., 2014) (“[A]dvanced
industrialized countries and a handful of developing countries should not have a monopoly on negotiat-
ing actionable rules on many of these issues, which could then be imposed on countries that had no say in
negotiating them.”).
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deals, as envisaged by President Trump in the United States and by Brexit
advocates on the other side of the Atlantic.18
Quite laudably, a few legal scholars have recently focused on the damage
to non-parties possibly resulting from other countries’ trade agreements.19
Among the preoccupations of this group is the identification of doctrines
and conceptual tools, within the realm of international law, apt to channel
and emphasize the concerns of non-participating states, with the goal of
reducing the megaregionals’ negative externalities and preventing the fur-
ther marginalization of countries not invited to the negotiation table.20 At
the same time, in unrelated academic milieus, private law scholars have
turned their attention to the plight of individuals or groups who are nega-
tively affected by “other people’s contracts.”21 In recent private law contri-
butions, it has been argued that legal systems should “expand the circle of
people [that] contract law seeks to protect.”22 Could private law theory pro-
vide useful matrices to analyze not just the externalities of contracts between
domestic actors, but also the repercussions of international trade agreements
upon non-parties?23
Most often, the notion of contract that is borrowed from private law for
the purpose of crafting international law arguments remains skeletal and
devoid of the other typical features of a domestic private law system. In
private law, some of the negative externalities of contracts can be redressed
by means of tort law, in the form of injunctions or compensatory damages in
favor of specially situated non-parties. Other externalities can be prevented
outright by limits placed upon contractual freedom,24 or can be offset by
private antitrust remedies, which in many systems are an outgrowth of the
tort of unfair competition. Additional contract rules—such as the interpre-
tive canon that favors public policy, or the unenforceability of deals in turpi
causa—are explicitly designed to minimize the harm to others.25 Finally,
regulatory constraints, usually deemed a matter of public law, complete the
18. Economist Intelligence Unit, Trade Liberalisation: Down but Not Out (Nov. 24, 2016), http://
country.eiu.com/article.aspx?articleid=924849476&Country=Indonesia&topic=Economy (predicting
“a proliferation of smaller trade deals” and a further fragmentation of the WTO multilateral framework).
19. Jacob Katz Cogan, MegaReg Research Project at NYU Law, Int’l L. Rep. (Mar. 31, 2016), http://
ilreports.blogspot.com/2016/03/megareg-research-project-at-nyu-law.html (highlighting megaregionals’
“impact on non-party countries as well as excluded and under-included groups”).
20. Most notably Klabbers, supra note 17; and Robert Howse, Regulatory Cooperation, Regional Trade R
Agreements, and World Trade Law: Conflict or Complementarity?, 78 L. & Contemp. Probs. 137 (2015).
21. Aditi Bagchi, Other People’s Contracts, 32 Yale J. Reg. 211, 217–21 (2015).
22. Jan Smits, The Expanding Circle of Contract Law, 27 Stellenbosch L. Rev. 227, 237 (2016).
23. At a high level of generality and with no distinction between common and civil law, “private
law” is meant here as “a unified field, of which the main branches (on contract, tort, property, family and
succession) are governed by conflicts between private autonomy and countervailing principles.” (Jan M.
Smits, Advanced Introduction to Private Law 1 (2017)).
24. Michael J. Trebilcock, The Limits of Freedom of Contract 20 (1993).
25. Steven Shavell, Contractual Holdup and Legal Intervention, 36 J. Legal Stud. 325, 346 (2007)
(noting that the management of externalities is one basic reason for judicial interference with contractual
autonomy).
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picture,26 but enough law concerning contract externalities is to be found
within the conceptual boundaries of private law as traditionally conceived.
This Article borrows from private law not only the archetypal idea of
contractual privity, but also an array of techniques and concepts developed
over time to determine whether non-parties should be granted remedies of
any sort against contracts to which they are not privy. As observed, this is a
question with especially high stakes in the context of trade agreements, and
an issue of utmost importance for scholars and policy makers concerned with
world poverty.27 From a global justice perspective, the negative externalities
suffered by struggling economies as a result of new RTAs are a worthwhile
subject of investigation, and private law allows for some progress in this line
of inquiry.
The question whether non-parties should be granted remedies against
other nations’ trade deals is too complex and context sensitive to find
straightforward solutions in theory. Nevertheless, a nuanced survey of the
private law of contracts’ externalities may allow us to sharpen the question
and, most importantly, to discard a few clearly wrong answers. In light of
this survey, I argue that the non-party remedies currently available in inter-
national trade law partake, regrettably, of the same features of non-party
strategies in private law: their indifference to distributive outcomes, the
neutrality of their design, and the interchangeable positioning of relevant
actors. Such remedies are therefore inherently unsuited to correct the stark
asymmetries of world trade and may, in fact, be part of the problem.
A foray in the history and theory of private law may contribute in two
ways, I argue, to contemporary trade law analyses. First, in a world market
that lacks a centralized system of public governance, special attention is
needed to the possibility of non-hierarchical arguments in favor of non-party
protection. Scholars’ reductionist view of the analogy between contracts and
treaties has generated an unnecessary heuristic vacuum. When fully articu-
lated, the analogy with private law calls for heightened focus on contracts’
negative externalities and on the crucial policy questions that are involved in
letting a system of discrete contracting replace multilateralism in world
trade. Second, the private law story evoked in these pages is a cautionary tale
for the handful of contemporary trade scholars who have focused on the pos-
sibility of remedies for non-parties. The experience of non-party remedies in
26. Within national legal orders, private contracting is embedded in a frame of government regula-
tion and macroeconomic constraints that find scant equivalents in the world order. Robert Howse, From
Politics to Technocracy—and Back Again: The Fate of the Multilateral Trading Regime, 96 Am. J. Int’l L. 94,
95 (2002). Most notably, antitrust rules, labor standards, and macroeconomic constraints have never
really congealed into enforceable norms on the global plain. See Anthea Roberts, Triangular Treaties: The
Extent and Limits of Investment Treaty Rights, 56 Harv. Int’l L. J. 353, 372 (2015) (“[I]n the international
law sphere . . . no overarching sovereign exists to authorize the pursuit of other goals over and above
those agreed to by states.”).
27. See, e.g., Thomas W. Pogge, World Poverty and Human Rights 18 (2d ed. 2008) (arguing
that the benefits of free trade have eluded the global poor).
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private law contexts, both in the United States and in Europe, is analytically
rich and yet unyielding from the perspective of distributive justice. History
shows that non-party remedies, being equally available to all market actors,
work not just towards correcting power asymmetries but, just as effectively,
towards reinforcing them. The idea that social welfare can be maximized by
a combination of free contracting and distribution-insensitive remedies is
simply untenable in a private-law game with few players, foreclosed moves,
thick history, and stark inequality. Because this is precisely the game of
contemporary international trade, we cannot expect a private law model,
offering equal moves to all types of players, to redress in any way the plague
of the global South.
***
The argument proceeds as follows. Part I sets the stage by noting a resur-
gence of a neo-classical notion of “contract” in the discourse on regional or
bilateral trade agreements. The analogy between treaties among states and
contracts between private parties is dissected in this part, so as to show that
a legal analysis of both domestic and international markets revolving around
a reductionist version of autonomy is descriptively and prescriptively dissat-
isfying. Part II elaborates on the relevance of private law theory in conceptu-
alizing the relation between parties (“A” and “B”) and non-parties (“C”),
and discusses early twentieth-century attempts to address contracts’ negative
externalities through private law strategies. This part aims to highlight the
distributive shortcomings of private law and the early realization, among
private law scholars, of the need for better tools and more direct political
engagement with the problem of market power asymmetries. Part III fo-
cuses on the fate of nations excluded from emerging RTAs and on recent
scholarly work aimed at addressing their predicaments. It begins with an
iconic tale of trade diversion: the death of Algeria’s wine industry following
the implementation of the European Economic Community (“EEC”) Treaty.
It then outlines the current trade law framework concerning non-parties in
RTAs. The remedies and strategic moves available to non-parties under the
current trade law regime, such as Articles XXIII and XXIV of the General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, remain inherently inadequate.28 As a re-
sult, their use may worsen, rather than correct, the socio-economic asymme-
tries caused by nations’ freedom to pursue better trade deals. By focusing on
the abstract availability of trade remedies for non-party nations, we risk ig-
noring a fundamental legacy of private law: a system that assumes market
players as equals cannot find, within its own logic, sound ways to redress
substantive inequality.
28. See infra Part III.
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I. Private-Law Contracts and Regional Trade Agreements
A. RTAs and the Resurfacing of the Transactional Paradigm
In international law circles, RTAs, as well as preferential trade agree-
ments (PTAs) of non-regional scope, are now the talk of the town. Since the
failure of the Doha Round, the chances of agreeing on a set of new global
trade rules within the purview of the WTO have become slim.29 Govern-
ments around the world have intensified trade negotiations with specific
state partners.30 The resulting deals, allowing for deeper trade liberalization
between a lower number of states than would be possible via multilateral
negotiations, may be bilateral or plurilateral, and may even encompass a
large region of the world. By definition, however, these deals take place off
the WTO’s multilateral path.31 The possibility for later accession of new
member states may be contemplated as an optional feature in some agree-
ments, but it is outright excluded in others.32
The literature discussing the relation between RTAs and the multilateral
WTO framework is by now immense.33 Scholars have debated at length
whether the creation of pockets of deep integration paves the way to multi-
lateral consensus or, to the contrary, throws a wrench in the WTO engine.34
The impact of megaregional agreements on developing countries has also
been a matter of discussion and speculation: the rise of megaregionals is
often correlated (as either cause or effect) to the failure of the Doha
29. Roberto Azeveˆdo, 11th Ministerial Conference Closing Ceremony, Dec 13, 2017, https://www
.wto.org/english/news_e/spra_e/spra209_e.htm (“Members did not manage to agree final, substantive
agreements this time. . . . We knew progress here would require a leap in members’ positions. We didn’t
see that.”).
30. Brummer, supra note 8, at 22–52. R
31. Uri Dadush, Potential Responses to Mega-regionals by Excluded Countries, in World Economic Fo-
rum, Mega-regional Trade Agreements, supra note 10, at 8, 28 (“[T]he negotiations of [TPP and R
TTIP] exclude some 160 countries, which are home to over 80% of the world population.”).
32. See, e.g., Dan Hamilton, TTIP: What are the implications for emerging powers and the international
order?, 3 Bridges Africa 10: 1 December 2014 (“[G]overnments have not stated whether and how the
eventual TTIP agreement, once concluded, might be open to others willing and able to commit to
similar goals and ground rules.”); Michael J. Trebilcock, Between Theories of Trade and Development: The
Future of the World Trading System, 16 J. World Inv. & Trade 122 (2015). Trebilcock recommends
“nudging” the various preferential trade agreements towards multilateralization, for example, by includ-
ing MFN clauses and giving the DSB of the WTO jurisdiction over RTA-based disputes. Id. at 137.
33. See, e.g., Lorand Bartels & Federico Ortino, Regional trade Agreements in the WTO
Legal System (Oxford Univ. Press 2006); Jagdish N. Bhagwati, Termites in the Trading System.
How Preferential Agreements Undermine Free Trade (2008); Kyle Bagwell & Robert W.
Staiger, Reciprocity, Non-discrimination and Preferential Agreements in the Multilateral Trading System 281, 282
(Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 5932, 1997) (“[P]referential agreements pose a
threat to the existing multilateral system.”).
34. See James Lake, Free Trade Agreements as Dynamic Farsighted Networks, 55 J. Econ. Inquiry 31, 31
(2017) (“[T]he proliferation of FTAs has stimulated substantial debate on whether FTAs hinder or facili-
tate greater liberalization, especially given the lack of multilateral liberalization since the 1994 Uruguay
Round. That is, are FTAs “building blocs” or “stumbling blocs” to global free trade?”); see also
Michael J. Trebilcock, Advanced Introduction to International Trade Law 48 (Edward El-
gar ed., 2015) (summarizing the literature as “developed and wide-ranging, but contentious”).
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Round35—a round that had started with a particular commitment to the
fate of developing economies. The fact remains that forming an RTA is, per
Hohfeld’s timeless taxonomy,36 a presumptively privileged activity, duly
codified in the world trade architecture and increasingly practiced by various
clusters of WTO members.
The proliferation of RTAs is a symptom of larger developments in the
world order. One such development is the re-emergence of the nation state
as a monadic actor in global trade discourse. Fin-de-sie`cle scholarship on
world organization was characterized by an emphasis on networks and on
links, diagonal and horizontal, either between states’ disaggregated compo-
nents—courts, agencies, legislators—or, more often, between private actors
operating across borders and exerting indirect rule-making power.37 The as-
cendance of the concept of “governance,” as opposed to “government,” was
meant to capture the diffusion of power beyond the artifacts of traditional
sovereignty and the replacement of top-down arrangements with informal,
softer, but overall more productive collaborative agreements.38 Within the
trade arena, policy makers and scholars placed much faith in the possibility
of spontaneous convergence, in “voice” (also for developing countries) as
opposed to “exit” at each WTO round, and in win-win global solutions to
the problem of collective risk management.39 The twenty-first-century, by
contrast, has so far been characterized by a resurgence of state-centered, na-
tionalist rhetoric in all sorts of disciplines, ranging from migration policy to
trade regulation. Current political discourse, voiced loudly during the Brexit
campaign and in the course of the 2016 U.S. presidential election, has re-
vived the idea of sovereignty as agency in a commercial sense. Within this
35. See, e.g., Ciuriak, supra note 11 (“For development, the Doha Round was a much better deal.”); R
Ron Sandrey, Mega-regional Trade Agreements and South Africa’s Trade Strategy: Implications for the Tripartite
Free Trade Area Negotiations, SAIIA Occasional Paper No. 195, July 2014 (“In a world where the World
Trade Organization (WTO) has lost much of its momentum, attention has been focused on regional and
bilateral trade agreements.”); Klabbers, supra note 17 (“Those who were critical of, say, the WTO, or R
thought the climate change regime does not go far enough, now come to defend these regimes—they
will be replaced by something that may be a lot worse for many people.”).
36. See Wesley Newcomb Hohfeld, Some Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Applied in Judicial Reasoning,
23 Yale L. J. 16, 43 (1913); Wesley Newcomb Hohfeld, Some Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Applied in
Judicial Reasoning, 26 Yale L. J. 710, 712 (1917).
37. Many versions exist of this state-disaggregation narrative. See, e.g., Gunther Teubner, Global
Bukowina: Legal Pluralism in the World-Society, in Global Law Without a State 49, 54 (Gunther
Teubner ed., 1991); Jessica T. Mathews, Power Shift, Foreign Aff., Jan.-Feb. 1997; Gabrielle Zoe
Marceau, A Call for Coherence in International Law: Praises for the Prohibition Against “Clinical Isolation” in
WTO Dispute Settlement, 33 J. World Trade 87, 88 (1999) (“Interdependencies between States, on all
levels, are rapidly increasing.”). Champions of the most extreme version of the state-disaggregation the-
ory were dubbed, somewhat derogatorily, “New Medievalists.” See Anne-Marie Slaughter, The Real New
World Order, Foreign Aff., Sept.–Oct. 1997 (arguing that “the state is not disappearing,” but that “it is
disaggregating into its separate, functionally distinct parts”).
38. R.A.W. Rhodes, The New Governance: Governing without Government, 44 Pol. Stud. 652, 652–53
(1996).
39. See J.H.H. Weiler, The Geology of International Law–Governance, Democracy and Legitimacy, 64
Zao¨RV (Heidelberg J. Int’l L.) 547, 549 (2004) (referring to fin-de-sie`cle international developments as
the accretion of a “regulatory layer” on top of earlier modes of relations between sovereign states).
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rhetorical frame, a sovereign who does not aim exclusively at maximizing
his/her own state’s profit in each and every bargain with other nations is a
political failure.40 At its lowest, current state-centered discourse portrays
world politics as a zero-sum game, which can be won only by tricking other
nations into grabbing the short end of the stick.41
The return or re-aggregation of the state as a global actor goes hand in
hand with another development, visible both in the form and in the sub-
stance of international trade discourse: the resurgence of ‘contract’ as a mode
of interaction between sovereign states. Per Joseph Weiler’s geological meta-
phor, the early twentieth-century predominance of bilateral treaties among
states was covered, with time, by other layers of international-law accre-
tion.42 Today, however, the transactional mode of inter-state relations is re-
turning to the surface, like an inner stratum of the earth in times of seismic
shifts. The words “deal” or “bargain,” typically used to refer to contracts
among private parties, are now the conceptual lens through which inter-
state trade relations are seen in influential political circles.43
This mode of discourse is ideologically ambivalent. On the one hand, the
idea of states’ contractual autonomy corroborates the false assumption that
all nations are equally positioned to make sovereign choices, and therefore
masks power imbalances among differently situated actors (both public and
private).44 The emphasis on sovereign autonomy downplays, as well, the in-
fluence that private actors and transnational regulatory entities, devoid of
democratic legitimacy, exert on states’ policies. Global value chains span
across national borders;45 multinational corporations interfere with govern-
ments’ regulatory powers; and transnational lobbies defend trade interests
that may well be misaligned with basic notions of the common good. The
state has only limited control on trade flows, and foreign investors often
40. See Stewart M. Patrick, Trump and World Order: The Return of Self-Help, Foreign Aff., Mar.–Apr.
2017.
41. Id.
42. Id.
43. For a coarse transposition of the private-law concept of contract onto the world trade plain, see
Donald J. Trump, The Art of the Deal (1987) and Nick Corasaniti et al., Donald Trump Vows to Rip
Up Trade Deals and Confront China, N.Y. Times (June 28, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/06/29/
us/politics/donald-trump-trade-speech.html?_r=0. See also, across the Atlantic, Julia Gray et al., No,
Britain Won’t Get a Better Deal Now, Wash. Post, June 28, 2016 (“Boris Johnson . . . insists that Britain
could strike an attractive deal with the European Union even if they’re not part of it.”).
44. See Joel P. Trachtman, The Antiglobalisation Paradox–Freedom to Enter into Binding International Law
is Real Freedom (reviewing Dani Rodrik, The Globalization Paradox: Democracy and the Fu-
ture of the World Economy (2013)); cf. Claire Cutler, Artifice, Ideology and Paradox: The Public/
Private Distinction in International Law, 4 Rev. Int’l Pol. Econ. 261, 264–65 (1997) (critiquing ne-
oliberal ideology for “assert[ing] the superiority of private law in the regulation of international com-
merce”); Dan Danielsen, Global Rules and a Global Economy: An Economic Policy Perspective, 1 Transnat’l
Legal Theory 49, 65 (2010) (noting that the notion of formal sovereign equality in international trade
law scholarship makes it harder to articulate the asymmetries between states as to bargaining power and
influence).
45. The IGLP Law & Global Production Working Group, The Role of Law in Global Value Chains: A
Research Manifesto, 4 London Rev. Int’l L. 57, 58 (2016).
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(re)write the agreements reached by sovereigns in diplomatic settings. The
focus on states’ sovereign autonomy tends to paper such things over and
therefore stands in the way of progressive agendas.46
On the other hand, it is still the case that deals struck by national govern-
ments—regarding tariffs, regulatory barriers to imports, rules of origin and,
most importantly, monetary policies—do affect the flow of goods, services
and capital. Much still depends on state-led strategies and on the allegiances
that nations form.47 This factual basis, in some scholarly circles, sustains an
intellectual commitment to state-centered welfare policies and keeps alive
the faith in the state’s unique capacity to steer and redistribute wealth. Au-
thors committed to social justice emphasize the centrality of the state as an
autonomous market player, in stark opposition to cosmopolitanism and to
the discursive dilution of states’ capacity.48 Leveraging the sovereign state’s
power to pick and choose its trade partners and policies is therefore a broad
trend in current legal scholarship—one that spans across wide-ranging
world views and very different strands of reflection. Under this “big tent,”
it is politically easier for domestic policy makers to opt for discrete preferen-
tial deals as opposed to WTO-based negotiations.
B. RTAs, Contracts, and Externalities
At both the technical and doctrinal level, the analogy between trade trea-
ties and private-law contracts encounters significant limitations. While the
legal system of the state confers to a contract the status of law between the
parties, in the international sphere there is no such centralizing structure,
and it is for this reason that Grotius felt he had to ground positive interna-
tional law upon natural law.49 Moreover, treaties are often prepared through
international organizations and open to the signatures of many more parties,
so that their formation rather resembles the production of law with erga
omnes effects.50 Nevertheless, bringing treaties within the conceptual frame
of private bargains is a move that rests on a time-honored and undying
tradition.51 The U.S. Supreme Court has routinely endorsed the treaty/con-
46. Id.
47. See generally Ralf Michaels, The Mirage of Non-State Governance, 2010 Utah L. Rev. 31 (2010).
48. Alexander Somek, The Cosmopolitan Constitution 283 (2014) (arguing that “the nation
state appears today more indispensable than ever before.”); see also Thomas Nagel, The Problem of Global
Justice, 33 Phil. & Pub. Aff. 113, 115 (2005).
49. Edoardo Colzani, L’interpretazione giudiziale dei trattati internazionali [The Judicial Interpreta-
tion of International Treaties], 127 (PhD Thesis, Universita` degli Studi di Milano 2014) (providing a
discussion of the limits of the analogy between contract and treaty).
50. Id.
51. Hersch Lauterpacht, Report on the Law of Treaties of the Special Rapporteur, 1953 Y.B. Int’l L.
Comm’n 94, U.N. Doc A/Cn.4/SER.A/1953/Add.1 (“The principle that treaties are agreements of a
contractual character is believed to be not only consistent with but also dictated by the preponderant
practice in the matter of their validity, interpretation and termination.”).
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tract analogy.52 Many jurists remain to this day convinced of the fundamen-
tally contractual nature of treaties, and base elaborate arguments on this
conviction.53
When it comes to international trade agreements among WTO parties,
the contract/treaty analogy needs further unpacking. The multilateral sys-
tem contemplated in the 1947 GATT famously adopted the Most Favored
Nation (“MFN”) principle as its cardinal rule precisely in order to extend to
all contracting parties the trade concessions agreed upon by any two states.
Tariff concessions could well be negotiated bilaterally, but any commitment
undertaken by GATT members had to be extended to all.54 If choosing
whom to deal with is the hallmark of contractual freedom, this freedom was
then curtailed mid-twentieth century: in line with the win-win narrative of
comparative advantage, states were meant to play the cooperative game
commonly known as multilateralism. The basic rules of this game were reci-
procity and non-discrimination.55
Yet two major exceptions to the MFN rule have since worked to boost
sovereign states’ autonomy in trade matters. One is to be found in Article
XXIV—the textual benchmark for the legality of small and large FTAs.
Built into the original GATT text upon the insistence of the United
States,56 Article XXIV contemplated the possibility that two or more mem-
bers would enter free trade areas or customs unions, abolishing virtually all
tariffs on each other’s products and practically merging their markets into
one. These clusters of thorough integration would operate as new single
entities in the MFN world. Non-parties would have no access to such areas’
internal deals. Because of the Article XXIV exception, special trade arrange-
ments among discrete sets of states have sprung up aplenty, eating away at
the MFN rule and yet remaining GATT compatible. The other broad excep-
tion emerged in post-colonial times, based on the plight of newly sovereign
states and on the rise of the law and development movement.57 The Ena-
bling Clause finally codified, within the GATT structure, the possibility to
52. See Curtis J. Mahoney, Treaties as Contracts: Textualism, Contract Theory, and the Interpretation of
Treaties, 116 Yale L.J. 824, 834–38 (2007) (giving examples of contract-treaty analogies over the course
of legal history).
53. Id. at 824–26 (suggesting that “courts draw from modern contract theory in developing canons of
treaty interpretation,” and positing that relational contract theory, as opposed to textualism and formal-
ism, which is textualism’s “private law cousin,” should inform the interpretation of treaties).
54. The idea that all contracting parties would enjoy most-favored nation status was not new in 1947,
but it acquired utmost prominence and conceptual centrality when codified in the General Agreement on
Tariffs and Trade art. I, Oct. 30, 1947, 4 U.S.T. 639, 55 U.N.T.S. 188 [hereinafter GATT].
55. Bagwell & Staiger, supra note 33, at 282. R
56. Kerry Chase, Multilateralism Compromised: The Mysterious Origins of GATT Article XXIV, 5 World
Trade Rev. 1, 8–11 (2006).
57. UNCTAD, Res. 21(ii), Preferential or Free Entry of Exports of Manufactures and Semi-manufactures of
Developing Countries to the Developed Countries (Mar. 26, 1968), in 1 Proc. United Nations Conf. on Trade &
Dev. 38 (1968) (calling for the establishment of a “generalized, non-reciprocal, non-discriminatory sys-
tem of preferences in favour of the developing countries, including special measures in favour of the least
advanced among the developing countries”).
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extend non-reciprocal trade concessions to developing or least developed
countries, and allowed states to depart, somewhat autonomously, from mul-
tilateral rules.58 Both Article XXIV and the Enabling Clause have let WTO
members engage in the contract-like practice of bargaining with chosen
partners in a formally autonomous manner.59
With the concept of bargain comes the idea of privity of contract, which
in turn corroborates the presumptive irrelevance of non-parties’ concerns.
The following quote exemplifies the widespread belief that negative exter-
nalities just do not belong in contract law theory:
[T]he bad things that firms do commonly entail imposing costs
on third parties, such as creating environmental harms or erecting
barriers to entry. These behaviors—the creation of negative exter-
nalities—are regulated by the environmental and antitrust laws.
An analysis of contract law as such therefore can assume the ab-
sence of externalities.60
Even scholars who are genuinely concerned with non-parties’ predicaments
are careful to frame their inquiry as a search for exceptions to an obvious
rule:
There is nothing intrinsically wrong in a contract’s benefitting its
parties to the detriment of a third party. Such is the nature of a
free market and the inevitable result of the principle of freedom of
contract. Indeed, this should normally be expected.61
The “rule” is that the harm to non-parties is privileged. It is, in old par-
lance, damnum absque injuria:62 real harm, but resulting from privileged con-
duct, and therefore not a trigger of legal remedies.63
58. GATT Contracting Parties, Differential and More Favorable Treatment, Reciprocity and Fuller Partici-
pation of Developing Countries, GATT Doc. L/4903 (Dec. 3, 1979) (“Enabling Clause”).
59. For qualifications of the notion of sovereign contractual autonomy, see infra Part I.
60. Alan Schwartz & Robert E. Scott, Contract Theory and the Limits of Contract Law (John M. Olin
Center for Studies in Law, Economics, and Public Policy, Working Paper No. 275, 2003). For a critique,
see Sina Akbari, Against the Reductionism of an Economic Analysis of Contract Law, 28 Can. J.L. & Juris.
245, 245–64 (2015), examining the claim that commercial contract law should be limited to helping
firms maximize profit and arguing that the idea of a strict normative division of labor between institu-
tions is problematic.
61. Benjamin Porat, Contracts to the Detriment of a Third Party: Developing a Model Inspired by Jewish
Law, 62 U. Toronto L.J. 347, 348 (2012). Porat starts from this alleged truism to investigate possible
exceptions: “The question is whether there are any exceptions[, i.e.,] circumstances in which the harm
the contract causes to the third party’s interest is actionable.” Id. at 348; see also Bagchi, supra note 21, at R
221 (“Contract law does not adequately account for the harm that we inflict on third parties by joint
agreement.”).
62. See generally Edward P. Weeks, The Doctrine of Damnum Absque Injuria Considered in
Relation to the Law of Torts (1879).
63. Vegelahn v. Gunter, 167 Mass. 92, 106 (1896) (Holmes, C.J., dissenting) (“[T]he doctrine gener-
ally has been accepted that free competition is worth more to society than it costs, and that on this
ground the infliction of the damage is privileged.”).
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In the context of trade agreements, one finds a similarly cavalier approach
to non-parties’ losses.64 As observed, should the TTIP come into force, even
if only in part, it would open up EU–U.S. trade channels reportedly ob-
structed by mostly non-tariff barriers and, as a consequence, would upset
preexisting trade equilibria way beyond its transatlantic axis. Yet, in line
with the idea of contractual privity, TTIP negotiations do not involve third
parties and do not factor in the consequences that a finalized deal might
have upon other regions of the world.65 A reductionist view of autonomy
makes this a completely acceptable frame for discussing the economics of
RTAs. Just about every deal is cause for trade diversion of some sort; yet, by
neoclassical lights, we are not supposed to worry about non-parties.
The reason why this regime has long been perceived as nonetheless just
and ethical is that, in principle, the harmed non-party retains its livelihood
and its freedom to engage in other profitable deals with others. Insofar as all
continue to enjoy the possibility to contract, all will be well. The harm
caused by others’ contracts can be remedied by means of additional con-
tracts. More, not less, autonomy is the traditional answer to non-parties’
plight. The universal possibility of exchange will move goods and services to
those who value them the most, with a net increase of social welfare and
benefits for all; per Adam Smith’s celebrated adage, the network of self-
interested deals will eventually bring dinner to all tables.66
Integral to private law, however, is the concept that at times a blind faith
in the power of diffuse autonomy is not the solution. Other moves are possi-
ble and, in fact, necessary.67 Liability rules have emerged over time precisely
towards the goal of protecting non-parties.68 In the international sphere,
there is no real analog for the public law mechanisms by which domestic
legal systems take care of contracts’ problematic externalities.69 One must
therefore tap for analytical insights those private law rules that in western
legal systems surround and complement the notion of contract and mark the
limits of contracts’ effects. Even when there is no public law source in sight,
contracts are supplemented by other norms of private conduct, and by a
network of enforceable claims available to specifically situated non-parties.
64. See infra Part III.
65. Pleas towards inclusion and openness can be found in informed literature. See, e.g., Bouman et al.,
supra note 10, at 171; Mertensko¨tter & Streinz, supra note 17, at 6. R
66. Adam Smith, The Wealth of Nations 22 (1776) (“It is not from the benevolence of the
butcher, the brewer, or the baker that we expect our dinner, but from their regard to their own
interest.”).
67. See generally Mahoney, supra note 52. R
68. See infra Part II.A.
69. See Roberts, supra note 26, at 372 (“[C]ontract law may give effect to policy and normative R
concerns that are independent of the contracting parties’ objectives. . . . [By contrast,] in the interna-
tional law sphere . . . no overarching sovereign exists to authorize the pursuit of other goals over and
above those agreed to by states.”); John Gerard Ruggie, Taking Embedded Liberalism Global: The Corporate
Connection, in Embedding Global Markets–An Enduring Challenge 231, 232 (John Gerard Rug-
gie ed., 2008) (“There is no government at the global level to act on behalf of the common good, as there
is at the national level.”).
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The analogy between trade agreements and contracts yields much more plia-
ble tools than stark autonomy and much more useful analytics.70
C. Markets of States as Markets of Individuals
The analogy between the market of sovereign states engaged in interna-
tional trade and the market of profit-maximizing individuals, albeit subject
to many nuances and complications, may enable effective communication
between law theory circles and set the stage for deeper inquiries.
The intuition driving this Article is that a world increasingly populated
by regional trade agreements and by clusters of special preferential regimes
comes to resemble a private law market of a particular type—a market with
a finite number of identifiable players, each looking to strike a deal with a
subset of fellow-players, and each with reliable information on the negotiat-
ing capacity of everyone else. The goal of each and every cluster of players is
to generate net gains for the parties, either with no regard to the negative
externalities the deal may bring onto others or precisely towards the goal of
placing others in relatively worse trade conditions. This market is also in-
habited by several weak players, whose negotiating ability is null or at best
sectoral, and by more or less defined groups of players whose interests hap-
pen to be aligned. In this sort of landscape, autonomy naturally works to
enable strategic coalitions which in turn create blocks of economic strength
and reinforce power asymmetries. In such contexts, slowly but surely, auton-
omy cannibalizes its own premises—freedom of contract, competition, etc.
The possibility of choosing whether or not to enter new agreements exists,
for weaker players, only in theory. Autonomous moves are, for many,
foreclosed.
Today, the private law markets that bear such characteristics are obvi-
ously governed not just by private law rules, but also by a complex regula-
tory apparatus including, most prominently, robust antitrust legislation,
limits to contractual freedom, and social safety nets for those unable to play
the private autonomy game. Variations between and within the European
Union and the United States are enormous,71 but both continents share a
basic appreciation for monitoring the competitiveness of their markets and
for maintaining a minimum core of welfare state. These are, however, twen-
tieth-century developments. Winding the clock back may be necessary to
establish the analogy these pages rest upon.
The norms concerning the protection of others from the harmful effects of
contracts began to be conceptualized, both in Europe and in the United
States, at the dawn of the twentieth century—a time that required making
70. Mahoney, supra note 52, at 846 (“As often as courts have repeated the axiom that treaties are R
contracts among nations, there has been remarkably little exploration of how contract theory should
inform the law of treaties.”).
71. See Alberto Alesina & Edward Glaeser, Fighting Poverty and Inequality in the US
and Europe: A World of Difference 2 (2004).
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sense of the notion of autonomy in a context of burgeoning cartels and
workers’ unions.72 It was in that context that jurists became acutely aware of
the risks that the dogma of private autonomy poses for non-parties and be-
gan to work on refining the balance between bilateral contracts and the
general economic order. Regulatory frameworks were then absent or, at best,
incipient. The struggles of collective bargaining in the work economy were
already acute, but labor law as we know it now did not exist.73 Likewise, the
welfare state was not yet an established concept, nor was there anything like
today’s enforcement capability in antitrust. With time, legislatures and ex-
ecutive branches would conquer such politically salient arenas and equip
them with firmer boundaries, but for decades the task of adjudicating the
conflict between the free consent of some and the economic interests of
others fell exclusively upon private-law judges and scholars, occasionally en-
lightened by realist intuitions.74 Doctrines aimed to protect non-parties
from the deals of others were culled from within private law’s architecture,
and non-parties came to be a factor in the judicial enforcement of such deals
long before the creation of public regulatory structures. The protection of
third parties took the guise of remedies in tort, injunctions against unfair
competition, or even fully contractual claims. To this day, even in heavily
regulated contexts, courts are called to redress non-parties’ claims simply on
the basis of private law rules and principles.
I turn now to these claims towards the goal of corroborating two points:
first, pacta nocent (contracts hurt), and time-tested rules demonstrate the im-
portance of recognizing at law the harm caused by the contracts of others,
even if only to maintain a market’s competitive livelihood. Second, the de-
sign of rules for non-parties’ protection cannot be indifferent to distributive
concerns.
II. Non-Parties in Private Law
A. Contracts as Torts to Others: Early Reflections
It is by now well documented that, both in Europe and in the United
States, the dawn of the twentieth century was a time of exceptional depth in
private law theory.75 It was a time when the connections between abstract
legal concepts and a fast-changing organization of the economy came to the
fore and when jurists began to articulate, in sharp terms, the ambivalent
72. See infra Part II.
73. See William Forbath, Law and the Shaping of the American Labor Movement 23
(1991).
74. See infra Part II.A.
75. See Anna di Robilant, Abuse of Rights: The Continental Drug and the Common Law, 61 Hastings L. J.
687, 736 (2009); Duncan Kennedy, A Transnational Genealogy of Proportionality in Private Law, in The
Foundations of European Private Law 185, 186 (Roger Brownsword, Hans-W. Micklitz, Leone
Niglia & Stephen Weatherill eds., 2011).
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distributive implications of seemingly straightforward torts, contracts, and
property rules.76 A full intellectual history of the notion that contractual
conduct may not be privileged, but rather deemed actionable injury to
others, exceeds the scope of this Article. It may be helpful, however, to
briefly trace the birth of the scholarly reflection on “contracts to the detri-
ment of others” in the United States and Europe.
As observed, the proliferation of large and small preferential trade agree-
ments has brought up the question whether the economic harm caused to
non-parties by new trade arrangements should be judicially remediable. In
private law, a primary point of departure for analogous reflections is the tort
of interference with contractual relations.77 Lumley v. Gye78—an old chestnut
of English law—provides useful analytics. When Mr. Gye, manager of the
opera house at Covent Garden, offered to hire opera singer Joanna Wagner,
Mr. Lumley took offence.79 Ms. Wagner was already engaged to sing at Her
Majesty’s Theater, then run by Lumley, but Gye’s offer was obviously more
attractive.80 In the famous dispute that ensued from these facts, English
judges gave Lumley both an injunction against Wagner, restraining her
from singing for others,81 and a tort remedy against Gye. The latter judg-
ment was no less remarkable than the former. Lumley, a non-party to the
contract between Gye and Wagner, was given a way of redress against the
harm caused by that contract. Lumley v. Gye was therefore an early judicial
instantiation of the very concept at the heart of these pages—namely, the
idea that a contract, when detrimental to non-parties, does not always count
as a privileged exercise of autonomy. Insightful commentary has since high-
lighted the questionable equities of the case.82 In mid-nineteenth century
London, private law remedies were granted to protect a prominent theater
manager from competition. By contrast, the fact that Ms. Wagner was de-
prived of the chance to make the most of her exquisite voice did not move
the English judiciary to compassion, and her plea remained wholly
unexpressed.83
The reflection on the possibility that contracts between two parties may
cause actionable harm to others was bound to deepen, and depth came in the
increasingly politicized context of competition among employers for the
76. The rapid economic transformations of the time led to sudden peaks of wealth and new valleys of
poverty, prompting new thinking in private law adjudication. See Morton Horwitz, The Transfor-
mation of American Law 1870-1960: The Crisis of Legal Orthodoxy 15 (1992).
77. Bianca Gardella, L’interferenza del terzo nei rapporti contrattuali: un’indagine
comparatistica [The Interference of Third Parties in Contractual Relationships: A Comparative In-
quiry] 20–25 (2008).
78. 118 Eng. Rep. 749 (K.B. 1853).
79. Id.
80. Id.
81. Lumley v. Wagner, 42 Eng. Rep. 687 (Ch. 1852).
82. See Sarah Swan, A New Tortious Interference with Contractual Relations: Gender and Erotic Triangles in
Lumley v. Gye, 35 Harv. J.L. & Gender 167, 170 (2012); Lea S. VanderVelde, The Gendered Origins of
the Lumley Doctrine: Binding Men’s Consciences and Women’s Fidelity, 101 Yale L.J. 775, 775–76 (1992).
83. VanderVelde, supra note 82, at 793. R
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most qualified workforce. In 1903, exactly fifty years after Lumley, an article
on ‘contracts to the detriment of third parties’ appeared on the first issue of
the Rivista del Diritto Commerciale.84 The author was Angelo Sraffa, a notable
jurist and a politically savvy individual in pre-fascist Italy.85 Sraffa’s schol-
arly intervention had been prompted by certain commercial practices he had
learned about as an attorney.86 These were confidential agreements between
insurance companies, obliging each of them to obtain the others’ consent
before poaching their best agents. Sraffa visualized the situation in the trian-
gular mode earlier stylized by the Lumley court: two rival companies and one
employee ready to accept the better offer.87 But Sraffa tilted the Lumley tri-
angle and focused on providing the employee, rather than the employer,
with a remedy in tort.88 The original employer’s denial of assent—a possi-
bility expressly contemplated in the arrangement between the insurance
companies—should be deemed a tortious assault on the contractual freedom
of the employee.89
Private law rules are supposed to be indifferent to the economic stance of
a particular plaintiff or defendant, and Sraffa’s doctrinal move, which re-
oriented the vector of corrective justice in tortious interference, was formally
not radical. The political implications of this move, however, did not go
unnoticed. A lively debate ensued on the pages of the Rivista. Sraffa de-
fended his strategy (using tort rules to constrain the contractual autonomy
of the insurance companies) as necessary to restore employees’ ability to
command better wages.90 Another Italian jurist, Silvio Perozzi,91 quickly
authored a passionate rebuttal, asserting the impeccable legality of the com-
panies’ confidential agreements and denying the possibility of a remedy in
tort for the employees.92 Perozzi preached the importance of letting all sorts
of “negative” pacts (not to do, not to buy, not to sell, not to hire) be legiti-
mate and unimpeded, so as to allow for the natural balancing of competing
interests. In Perozzi’s view, curbing private autonomy through tort moves
84. Angelo Sraffa, Contratto in Danno a Terzi [Contract to the Detriment of Third Parties], 1 Rivista
del Diritto Commerciale e del Diritto Generale delle Obbligazioni [Review of Commercial
Law and of the General Law of Obligations] 453 (1903).
85. Angelo Sraffa was a distinguished jurist, a founding member of modern Italian commercial law,
and an engaged anti-fascist intellectual. He founded with Cesare Vivante the Rivista del Diritto Commer-
ciale e del Diritto Generale delle Obbligazioni. See Annamaria Monti, Angelo Sraffa: Un “antiteor-
ico” del diritto [Angelo Sraffa: An “Anti-Theorist” of the Law] 42–55 (2011).
86. Sraffa, supra note 84, at 455; see Gardella, supra note 77, at 263. R
87. Sraffa did not hint at Lumley, nor at any other judicial pronouncement in this Article. Sraffa, supra
note 84.
88. Id. at 456.
89. Id. at 457.
90. Id. at 453.
91. Silvio Perozzi, Ancora sui contratti a danno di terzi [Still on Contracts to the Detriment of Third
Parties], 2 Rivista del Diritto Commerciale e del Diritto Generale delle Obbligazioni [Re-
view of Commercial Law and of the General Law of Obligations] I, 64 (1904).
92. See Gardella, supra note 77, at 263. R
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would go against the grain of sensible economic law.93 In a counter-reply,
Sraffa took pains to highlight the high stakes of this scholarly diatribe. Such
questions, he argued, ran deeper than mere legal deduction and could only
be addressed through social judgment, moral choices, and “idee direttrici”
(vectors).94
Another prominent jurist, Oliver Wendell Holmes, had meanwhile made
analogous observations in the United States, but with regard to a different
type of triangular situation: two (or more) workers, one employer.95 Holmes
had been preoccupied with the courts’ inclination to grant companies in-
junctions against their workers, so as to prevent them from unionizing. Dis-
senting from this judicial trend, Holmes famously took apart the traditional
justification for anti-union injunctions.96 He showed that in the “struggle
for life” there was no reason for granting workers a lesser degree of auton-
omy than the one enjoyed by their employers. If competition was deter-
mined to be a good thing, it had to be good for all, not just for capital. Even
more famously, Holmes argued that jurists should not pass as mere legal
deduction what was instead a politically sensitive choice; that the decision to
enjoin union organizers from peaceful picketing could not be explained away
by the need to protect the contractual rights of employers; and that the
policy choice behind granting or denying anti-union injunctions had better
be made through legislative intervention (an intervention that famously
came in 1932, with the passage of the Anti-Injunction Act, after decades of
enjoined labor struggles).97
The private law moves argued for by Sraffa in his article and by Holmes
in Vegelhan were different. Sraffa posited that the detriment stemming from
the contracts of others should be redressed in tort; Holmes instead defended
the autonomy of workers to organize into unions, so as to counteract the
phenomenon of employers’ de facto cartelization. In his words,
One of the eternal conflicts out of which life is made up is that
between the effort of every man to get the most he can for his
services, and that of society, disguised under the name of capital,
to get his services for the least possible return. Combination on
the one side is patent and powerful. Combination on the other is
93. Perozzi, supra note 91, at 66 (“[H]armed parties are not given recourse at law. And they R
shouldn’t! Today’s economic struggle depends on [this].”) (author’s translation). Referring to this state-
ment, Sraffa dubbed Perozzi “a social Darwinist.” Angelo Sraffa, [Untitled Reply to Perozzi], 2 Rivista
Del Diritto Commerciale e del Diritto Generale delle Obbligazioni [Review of Commercial
Law and of the General Law of Obligations] I, 66, 68 (1904).
94. Sraffa, supra note 93, at 68. R
95. There is no evidence, to my knowledge, of direct connections between Sraffa’s scholarship and
Holmes’s writings, though references to social Darwinism are common to both authors. See Richard
Hofstadter, Social Darwinism in American Thought 47, 121 (Beacon Press 1992) (1944).
96. Vegelahn v. Gunter, 167 Mass. 92, 106 (1896) (Holmes, C.J., dissenting).
97. Oliver Wendell Holmes, Privilege, Malice and Intent, 8 Harv. L. Rev. 1, 3 (1894) (“Questions of
policy are legislative questions.”).
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the necessary and desirable counterpart, if the battle is to be car-
ried on in a fair and equal way.98
Whereas Sraffa aimed at constraining the contractual freedom of capital,
Holmes vouched for expanding the contractual freedom of labor. Nonethe-
less, the similarity—indeed, the identity—between the two men’s quest for
explicit policy vectors is striking. Both were acutely aware that the mere
identification of a private law move (more, or less, autonomy for either labor
or capital) would lead to indeterminate results, depending on which party
would be found worthy of protection in the triangular structures of labor/
capital relations.
Holmes had much to say, as well, on the difficult choices involved in
determining when, exactly, the exercise of private autonomy should no
longer be privileged. Could private agreements produce externalities that are
undesirable from a policy perspective, and hence become unlawful?99 On his
mind were both yellow-dog employment contracts, aimed at suppressing
workers’ bargaining power, and labor agreements aimed at boosting it.100
The radically different portents of such deals made it clear, in Holmes’s
view, that assessing their lawfulness would involve not just deduction from
abstract principles, but rather consideration of conflicting interests and set-
tlement of divergent views of the common good.101 A simple belief in the
benefits of competition, or in the value of private autonomy, would not solve
the question of which types of agreements should be presumptively privi-
leged.102 The U.S. Supreme Court would soon decide precisely such ques-
tions as matters of antitrust and interstate commerce.103 But Holmes had
laid out all relevant issues simply by articulating, in private law terms, the
analytical stance of non-parties.
98. Vegelahn, 167 Mass. at 106 (Holmes, C.J., dissenting); see also Hitchman Coal & Coke Co. v.
Mitchell, 245 U.S. 229, 263 (1917) (Brandeis, J. dissenting). A prominent example of “patent and
powerful” combination on the side of capital, at the time, was to be found in the English case Mogul
Steamship: Mogul Steamship Co. Ltd. v. McGregor, Gow, & Co., [1889] 23 Q.B.D. 598, aff’d [1892]
A.C. 25 (Eng.) (“[D]efendants have been guilty of none of these acts [fraud, misrepresentation, intimida-
tion, obstruction and molestation]. They have done nothing more against the plaintiffs than pursue to
the bitter end a war of competition waged in the interest of their own trade.”).
99. Holmes, supra note 97, at 13 (“[T]here is no absolute privilege to make agreements which are not R
unlawful on their face. . . . An agreement may be unlawful, because under the particular circumstances it
tends to produce [a result that the law wishes to prevent].”).
100. Early cases concerning the protection of yellow-dog employers from the interference of labor
activists and union organizers were decided simply on the basis of state common law. See Walter Wheeler
Cook, Privileges of Labor Unions in the Struggle for Life, 27 Yale L. J. 779, 779–82 (1917).
101. Holmes, supra note 97, at 7 (“Views of policy are taught by experience of the interests of life. R
Those interests are fields of battle. Whatever decisions are made must be against the wishes and opinion
of one party, and the distinctions on which they go will be distinctions of degree.”).
102. Id. (“Even the economic postulate of the benefit of free competition, which I have mentioned
above, is denied by an important school.”).
103. See, e.g., Loewe v. Lawlor, 208 U.S. 274 (1908) (holding that the Sherman Antitrust Act prohib-
ited a secondary boycott organized by a union and aided by the American Federation of Labor).
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B. Examples of Non-Parties’ Remedies Today
The analysis of non-compete clauses in employment agreements and of
private remedies for antitrust violations has evolved tremendously over the
past century. Many of the issues identified in early private-law scholarship
have been subsumed into statutory rules, duly vetted in the political arena,
and fully articulated in economic terms.104 It is still the case, however, that
the law of private remedies continues to fill in the blanks of public law in
the regulation of market economies. It is also the case that the issue of non-
parties in private law discourse attracts, for a variety of reasons, increasing
attention today. For instance, in the context of sovereign debt repayment
obligations, the voice of non-parties can be heard loud and clear:
[T]he very notion of a “contract,” with its strong legal underpin-
ning in private law, has been blurred to the point that it now
encompasses ambiguous and contested principles and expectations
by which third-parties outside the contracted exchange claim a
stake at the table of negotiation.105
Indeed, while freedom to compete still occupies the center stage of west-
ern legal systems, the fact that contracts can cause harm to others is well
known in multiple fields, and remedies against other people’s contracts are
regularly granted in several settings. Prominent among such settings is the
law of unfair competition, built into private law through the interplay of
torts, contracts, and property entitlements. Publicly enforced antitrust rules
make up the backbone of competitive markets, but salient questions of eco-
nomic policy characterize, to this day, the adjudication of private claims in
the shadow of public antitrust enforcement. The law of unfair competition is
particularly well suited to monitor the current debate on non-parties in pri-
vate law discourse. The ongoing controversy on umbrella pricing provides a
case in point.
In a market characterized by cartels, and therefore by artificially high
prices for goods or services, new entrants may be able to reap equally in-
flated profits simply as a result of “intelligent adaptation,” i.e., by mimick-
ing a cartel’s price without in any way joining it. The cartel provides a
convenient “umbrella” that shelters other vendors from potentially aggres-
sive price competition. Consumers who purchase goods or services from such
vendors will therefore suffer the price increase due to the cartel, even though
104. Michael J. Garrison & John T. Wendt, The Evolving Law of Employee Noncompete Agreements: Recent
Trends and an Alternative Policy Approach, 45 Am. Bus. L.J. 107, 108 (2008).
105. Gre´goire Mallard & Je´roˆme Sgard, Contractual Knowledge: One Hundred Years of Legal Experimenta-
tion in Global Markets, in Contractual Knowledge: One Hundred Years of Legal Experimenta-
tion in Global Markets 1, 2 (Gre´goire Mallard & Je´roˆme Sgard eds., 2016). The quoted passage
refers to the debt bond between thousands of private investors and the Greek State—a transaction some-
how still deemed a contract.
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they never bought anything from any of the cartel members. Should they be
allowed to seek reparation in a tort lawsuit against the concerted vendors?
Both in Europe and in the United States, this question may well receive
an affirmative answer in court. The Court of Justice of the European Union
has recently provided a cautious and qualified green light for the courts of
the member states to award umbrella-pricing damages.106 In 1977, the U.S.
Supreme Court took a negative stance on the claims of “indirect purchas-
ers,”107 but since then many states have enacted statutes allowing indirect
purchasers to recover provable damages.108 The policy debate on either side
of the Atlantic typically weighs, on the one hand, deterrence from anti-
competitive conduct and, on the other, the loss of market efficiency that
might result from over-deterrence. In the European Union, a moralist streak
marbles the condemnation of anticompetitive conduct and corroborates the
argument for umbrella damages.109 By contrast, the arguments against recov-
ery are based on issues of institutional competence: given the distributive
ambiguity of damage recovery, shouldn’t courts wait for clear legislative
guidance?110 In the United States, much emphasis has been placed on the
impossibility of “getting it right” in court given the difficulty of determin-
ing both causation and quantifiable damages.111
The fact that umbrella-pricing recovery remains a hotly debated topic in
the Global North corroborates the intuition at the core of these pages: con-
tracts concluded by a subset of powerful market players, as well as contracts
that create clusters of power where no such clusters existed before, generate
consequences that private law may well qualify as unlawful harm. A genera-
lized increase of prices, way beyond a cartel’s confines, cannot simply be
archived as damnum absque injuria or as “mere redistribution among [inno-
cent] market participants.”112 The decision whether to provide injured par-
ties with remedies is never easy and never unqualified.
Equally unsettled is the corner of unfair competition law occupied by the
tort of interference with prospective contractual relations.113 Much has
changed since the days of Lumley, but courts still have a hard time deciding
106. See Till Schreiber & Vasil Savov, Kone v Commission: Umbrella Damages Claims, 5 J. Eur. Competi-
tion L. & Prac. 548, 548–49 (2014).
107. See Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 720, 725 (1977).
108. Id. at 740–46.
109. See C-577/12, Kone v. O¨BB-Infrastruktur ¶ 68, ECLI:EU:C:2014:45 (“[T]he model for trading
on the internal market should come in the form of undertakings that comply with the competition rules,
not those that seek to engage in illegal practices there at the expense of others. Should the recognition of
an obligation on cartel members to pay compensation for umbrella pricing have the effect of keeping
black sheep away from the market, this would hardly be detrimental to competition.”).
110. Jens-Uwe Franck, Umbrella Pricing and Cartel Damages under EU Competition Law, 11 Eur. Com-
petition J. 135, 153 (2015).
111. See Spencer Weber Waller, Incoherence of Punishment in Antitrust, 78 Chi.-Kent L. Rev. 207, 208
(2003).
112. Franck, supra note 110, at 140. R
113. I focus on this tort, rather than on its twin “tortious interference with performance of contract
by third person,” Restatement (Second) of Torts § 766 (Am. L. Inst. 1979), because the former
\\jciprod01\productn\H\HLI\59-2\HLI202.txt unknown Seq: 23 21-JUN-18 12:18
2018 / Non-Parties 411
whether or not to grant damages (or injunctions) when the prospects of an
existing business relation between two parties are sabotaged by new compet-
itive activities. The judicial space for restoring pure economic loss is fa-
mously narrow. The rule that economic loss is not recoverable in tort still
holds sway and is supposed to preserve the boundary between tort and
breach of contract.114 Yet the rule lacks real theoretical foundations and still
begs fundamental questions: when does public policy commend the imposi-
tion of duties upon market actors? Which of the infinite competitive activi-
ties, precisely designed to hurt other businesses, should be deemed tortious?
Unsurprisingly, the rule is riddled with exceptions and the exceptions are in
turn ill-defined.115 Interference with business relations is to this day actiona-
ble in tort,116 but the defendant is allowed to plead that her conduct is
justified.117 The wrongfulness of her conduct or her motive for acting will
need to be assessed in court with very little doctrinal guidance.118 Recent
commentary has highlighted judicial uncertainty and criticized the defini-
tion of tortious interference provided by the Restatement (Second) of Torts
as hopelessly open-ended.119
Such unsettled legal issues stem entirely from within the fabric of private
law and are not resolved, or even enlightened, by the solid regulatory appa-
ratus of contemporary antitrust law. This is precisely why tortious interfer-
ence, umbrella pricing remedies, and other mechanisms for the protection of
non-parties are relevant to the discussion of RTAs’ negative externalities:
even in the absence of global governance, even with no world-wide antitrust
rules, and even if one espouses an entirely pre-constitutional understanding
of international law, one cannot posit the existence of untrammeled contrac-
tual freedom to form RTAs at leisure. The extent of this freedom, as well as
the need to balance it with the interests of non-parties, are contestable issues
lends itself better to comparisons with the so-called non-violation provision in Art. XXIII of the General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, supra note 54, discussed infra in Part III. R
114. Catherine M. Sharkey, The Remains of the Citadel (Economic Loss Rule in Products Cases), 100 Minn.
L. Rev. 1845, 1846–47 (2016).
115. Id. at 1881 (“[D]ebates about the economic loss rule have obscured the fundamental issue: the
justification for recognizing public policy imposed duties in tort, especially in the sphere of commercial
or financial losses. Only once this is decided—namely the appropriate domain for tort law—can the
economic loss rule police the borders.”).
116. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 766B (Am. L. Inst. 1979) (“One who intentionally and
improperly interferes with another’s prospective contractual relation is subject to liability to the other for
the pecuniary harm resulting from loss of the benefits of the relations, whether the interference consists
of: a) inducing or otherwise causing a third person not to enter into or continue the prospective relation
or b) preventing the other from acquiring or continuing the prospective relation.”).
117. Id. § 768(1).
118. Ryan M. Connor, Revisiting the Restatement’s Tortious Interference Provisions, A.B.A. (June 3, 2014),
http://apps.americanbar.org/litigation/committees/businesstorts/articles/spring2014-0513-revisiting-re-
statement-of-torts-tortious-interference-provisions.html (documenting and endorsing several critiques of
the Restatement’s “muddled standard”). See also Swan, supra note 82, at 168–69 for further critical R
references.
119. Orrin K. Ames III, Tortious Interference with Business Relationships: The Changing Contours of This
Commercial Tort, 35 Cumb. L. Rev. 317, 324–25 (2004).
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posing unavoidable policy choices. The larger point to be drawn from such
reflections is that the principle of autonomy, in any market characterized by
finite numbers of players and goods, will unavoidably generate its own limi-
tations, whether logical or functional, and will have to be shored up by rules
and mechanisms of control in order to guarantee its own survival. The dis-
tributive impact of such rules and mechanisms will then be of paramount
importance.
C. Recent Developments in Private Law Theory
In recent years the cause of finding private-law avenues for the protection
of non-parties has found new champions.120 The mode of analysis adopted by
these private law scholars (i.e. their focus on triangular situations) is in sev-
eral ways analogous to current debates about negative externalities in the
context of trade agreements, and is therefore highly relevant to this inquiry.
Ian Smits, a jurist trained in the civil law of continental Europe, starts
from the well-known assumption that the negative externalities of contracts
are a natural part of the private law system and that mere economic disad-
vantage suffered by non-parties is by definition non-actionable. A different
approach, he argues, might however be required towards interests that are
not merely economic. The non-party interests that Smits contemplates as
possibly within the purview of contract law are “social.”121 He thinks of
labor rights in sweatshops and human rights to air and water in developing
countries, thereby paying attention to transnational externalities: the prac-
tice of competitive merchandise sales in one part of the globe may be the
reason for child labor in another. In a globalized marketplace populated by
value chains and based on the practice of outsourcing, the Global North
easily inflicts environmental damage or exploits poor labor conditions in far-
away places, yet Adidas shareholders or Walmart customers—to name just
two examples—are wholly insulated from such harms. Smits points out,
correctly, that in transnational scenarios the usual division of labor (private
law for corrective justice, public law for redistribution) cannot possibly
work, because there is no tax-and-transfer between, say, U.S. tax revenue
from clothing retail and the Bangladeshi welfare system. This leads Smits to
surmise that distributive justice might one day inform private law doc-
trines.122 Smits acknowledges that the private law frame of corrective justice
120. Porat, supra note 61, at 348; Bagchi, supra note 21, at 218; Smits, supra note 22, at 215. R
121. It bears noting that the sharp distinction between social harm (in the form of poor labor or
environmental standards) and economic harm (as measured by average income level) is a building block
of EU law’s architecture. The distinction is, as well, the target of radical critiques. See Damjan Kukovec,
Law and the Periphery, 21 Eur. L.J. 406, 407–08 (2015) (denouncing the fact that the social/economic
distinction, while conceptually untenable, ends up privileging social rights in the EU’s most prosperous
centers, thereby keeping the “periphery” in a permanent state of disadvantage).
122. The centrality of corrective justice in private law continues to have significant support in both
Europe and North America. See generally Ernest J. Weinrib, The Idea of Private Law 2 (2d ed.
2012).
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is currently too narrow to include non-party interests, yet he contemplates
the possibility of change in contract law as a reflection of the public’s grow-
ing concern for contracts’ negative externalities.123 Smits notes that other
legal scholars have explored theoretical rationales for bringing remote social
costs to bear on business or consumer transactions at strategic points along
the value chain.124 He mulls over the argument that contracts producing
socially repugnant externalities should be outright prohibited as against
public policy or in turpi causa, but dismisses this solution as “crude” and
unable to nudge contracting parties towards more socially conscious prac-
tices.125 In his view, judges should rather grant injunctions against the per-
formance of contracts that would cause egregious humanitarian damage to
non-parties.
In contrast to Smits, Benjamin Porat focuses exclusively on business is-
sues.126 Porat makes the argument that some types of economic harm to
non-parties can and should be remediable. He draws a distinction between
contracts having an “internal business logic,” only incidentally harmful to
non-parties, and contracts designed specifically towards the goal of causing
harm to others. He identifies discrete areas of the law (bankruptcy, family,
and taxation) in which a non-party, economically burdened by a transaction
among others, can access legal remedies. Building on such foundations, and
resorting to principles of Jewish law, Porat stretches the general duty of
good faith beyond the confines of privity and argues that contracting parties
also owe such a duty to potential “victims” of their transactions. Porat
posits, therefore, that “in some cases”127 the harm to third parties—a prod-
uct of “bad faith” as redefined—should not be privileged. Per Porat’s ad-
mission, the task of distinguishing between actionable and non-actionable
harm under his test is not easy; yet, by his lights, it would not be any harder
than the usual good faith analysis, which is—most clearly in U.S. courts—
always a thorny question of fact.
Porat’s intuition is interesting, but it may not survive Holmesian scru-
tiny. In Privilege, Malice and Intent, Holmes famously made it clear that the
judicial quest for a malicious element into such arrangements as boycotts or
workers’ unionization was no more than an attempt to cast policy choices in
123. Smits identifies in recent literature some evidence of such growing concern. See Alan Fairn-
ington, The Age of Selfish Altruism: Why New Values are Killing Consumerism 25 (2010);
Making Globalization Good: The Moral Challenges of Global Capitalism 305–19 (John H.
Dunning ed., 2005).
124. Lyn Kim Lan Tjon Soei Len, The Effects of Contracts Beyond Frontiers: A Capabili-
ties Perspective on Externalities and Contract Law in Europe 161–62 (2013).
125. Smits, supra note 22, at 229 (“[I]llegality [is] a crude instrument. . . . Declaring the multina- R
tional’s contract with a global supplier unenforceable means throwing away the baby with the bathwater:
the contract must not be unenforceable, it must be different.”); see also Bagchi, supra note 21, at 212 (“We R
rely too much on the blunt instrument of outlawing terms without attending to the effects of enforceable
agreements.”).
126. Porat, supra note 61, at 238. R
127. Id. at 350.
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the language of legal deduction.128 Porat’s main examples—fraudulent con-
veyance, the hiding of marital assets, and tax avoidance—are rather extreme
cases of fraud. But when the issue is even slightly subtler, Porat’s good faith
test is as indeterminate today as malice was in 1894.
On this line-drawing exercise, Aditi Bagchi has more to say. Like Porat
and unlike Smits, Bagchi considers it plausible for a private law system to
redress negative externalities of a purely economic character. Contrary to
Porat, however, she looks for solutions within contract law and does not
discuss any remedies that would be directly actionable by non-parties, for
example in tort. Remedial action would occur in court, by means of an in-
terpretive canon that resolves ambiguity in favor of non-parties’ interest and
minimizes the extent of the harm they suffer. Non-parties would remain
outside this judicial process and could in no way initiate it, but they would
nonetheless benefit from it if one party were to sue the other. This is an
obvious limitation in Bagchi’s construct: her solution, dependent on judicial
interpretation, presupposes that contracts be litigated in court and also that
textual ambiguity be a plausible issue. Bagchi’s work, however, remains
substantively helpful.
First, Bagchi discerns concentrated negative externalities from diffuse ones
and argues, persuasively, that it is fully within the purview of private law to
try and minimize (only) concentrated externalities. To be sure, the distinc-
tion between concentrated and diffuse externalities comes to resemble other
open-ended legal quests such as causation, proximity, or standing, and does
not seem to advance the cause of non-parties in an operational way. More
insightful is the divide she identifies within the category of concentrated
externalities: most of these are normal byproducts of transactions; but some
of them must be judicially minimized when possible. The latter category
shall consist, in Bagchi’s argument, of externalities that run against interests
already recognized through explicit public policies in the legal system of
reference.
Here is where Bagchi clearly departs from Porat. Recall that Porat’s good
faith test would leave intact just about every transaction that has an inde-
pendent economic rationale. His net would only catch cases of “bad faith”
against non-parties—a very wide mesh indeed. Besides, as pointed out by
the legal realist literature discussed earlier in these pages, “bad faith” could
mean everything and nothing, and judicial decisions taken on this ground
would beg Holmesian questions as to the value choices underlying each
judgment. Bagchi’s proposal, by contrast, requires a judicial finding of spe-
cific policy vectors (Sraffa’s “idee direttrici”) and explicit reasons to protect,
at private law, some non-parties rather than others in the course of contract
128. Holmes, supra note 97, at 3–4. R
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interpretation.129 This sort of judicial activity would not introduce new
value hierarchies in the system, but rather reflect, and therefore amplify,
already existing public policies. Bagchi’s construct is elegantly built and
fully compatible with mainstream contract law theory—in fact it only re-
quires a marginal reworking of already existing contract rules, such as the
canon of reasonable interpretation of ambiguous clauses.130 Porat’s proposal,
more comfortably situated in the realm of injunctive remedies, could be
sturdier and immediately available to non-parties, but it says nothing about
the legal system’s values. If Smits’s intuition is correct, however, new values
are infiltrating our understanding of private law, and it is in the name of
such values that avenues for non-party protection should be devised.
Part III below shall zoom precisely onto the question of which values, or
policies, the world system of trade law espouses, so as to determine not
whether non-parties’ interests should be factored into the negotiations of new
RTAs and/or compensated ex post facto, but rather which non-parties de-
serve protection, and through which tools. The proposed TTIP provides a
case in point. The aforementioned argument that any harm to the Sub-
Saharan economy, predictably stemming from the TTIP, should not be dis-
missed as damnum absque injuria does not rest on the belief that the EU and
the United States should begin to care about Africa’s economic prospects. It
is rather based on the fact that they have already chosen to care. As recently
as 2015, the U.S. administration renewed its commitment to African devel-
opment through the AGOA,131 an Act that establishes preferential trade
rules for imports from Africa.132 The EU’s pledge of a generous trade rela-
tion with Africa continues to be attested by the negotiation of new preferen-
tial agreements with African states.133 In other words, African states already
hold a bundle of legal interests that Bagchi would identify as “recognized.”
Even if only for the sake of foreign policy coherence, the deepening of
U.S.–EU trade relations should not interfere negatively with such commit-
ments. Yet it may very well do so.
D. Lessons from Private Law Theory
Before returning to the issue at the heart of these pages, namely the nega-
tive externalities of new RTAs in world trade law, it may be helpful to
129. Bagchi, supra note 21, at 226 (“Not all externalities are legally cognizable harms. . . . Only when R
we burden a legally recognized entitlement does the law undertake either to deter us from imposing
externalities on others or force compensation.”).
130. Id. at 216–17 (“Where third party interests are reflected in background legal norms, courts
interpret ambiguous agreements in ways that minimize harm to those third parties.”).
131. African Growth and Opportunity Act, 19 U.S.C.A. § 3701 (2000).
132. Joshua P. Meltzer, Deepening the United States-Africa Trade and Investment Relationship, Brookings
(Jan. 28, 2016), https://www.brookings.edu/testimonies/deepening-the-united-states-africa-trade-and-in-
vestment-relationship/ (testimony of Joshua P. Meltzer before the U.S. International Trade Commission).
133. For a critical discussion of such arrangements, see generally Mark Langan, The Moral Econ-
omy of EU Association with Africa (2016).
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summarize two basic insights gained through the foregoing private law
inquiry.
The first is a lesson in technique. The issue of contract externalities in an
allegedly competitive market can be addressed by two alternative types of
“moves” in private law. One consists of making sure that injured non-par-
ties retain the same degree of autonomy enjoyed by others, letting them reap
the rewards that new contracts may bring and letting them inflict, as neces-
sary, new externalities on others. This move insists on symmetry between all
market actors before the law and draws its strength precisely from the resili-
ence of symmetry lines in most private law constructs.134 It is a move that
expands the contractual autonomy of weaker parties. Holmes’s view of labor or-
ganization at the dawn of the twentieth century was that workers should be
given freedom to peacefully unionize or “conspire” through contract, simply
because a similar freedom was widely enjoyed by employers. Anti-union in-
junctions—technically “property rules” in favor of employers—unduly al-
tered the labor/capital symmetry and should not, in his view, be granted.
Per Holmes’s Vegelhan dissent, removing anti-union injunctions from the
picture would restore a competitive balance between labor and capital. This
could be done in common-law courts simply by dispelling the assumption of
maliciousness in employees’ organization.
The other move available at private law rests on the acknowledgment that
the system may be better off by preventing, minimizing, or offsetting cer-
tain types of contract externalities. This can be done through injunctions
and tort remedies in favor of non-parties, or through regulatory and contrac-
tual limits on the contracts of others.135 This move constrains the contractual
autonomy of stronger parties so as to preserve the competitive space of other
market actors. The choice between the first move and the second one de-
pends on circumstances and availability, but they are both based on the
private law axiom of a non-hierarchical market populated by symmetrically
situated actors. Both the expansion and the contraction of autonomy can be
based on existing private-law doctrines and derived from established theo-
retical premises.136
134. The presumption of symmetry is a conceptual feature that sets private law apart from the public
law sphere, where relations between sovereign and subjects, or state and citizens, are understood as
asymmetrical. Private law’s symmetry comes in trite formulations (as per C-26/13, A´rpa´d Ka´sler
Hajnalka Ka´slerne´ Ra´bai v. OTP Jelza´logbank Zrt ¶ 104, ECLI:EU:C:2014:85 (invoking the baseline
“equality between the sellers or suppliers and the consumers”)) as well as innovative ones, see Hans-W.
Micklitz, Introduction to The Many Concepts of Social Justice in European Private Law 3 (Hans-
W. Micklitz ed., 2011) (introducing the concept of access justice, understood as the ability for all to be
market participants, in the context of EU consumer law).
135. The three prongs of this move clearly map onto the famous triad of property rules, liability rules,
and inalienability. See Guido Calabresi & Douglas A. Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Inalien-
ability: One View of the Cathedral, 85 Harv. L. Rev. 1089, 1089–93 (1972). Bagchi’s proposed rule of
interpretation would count as an indirect (judicial) regulatory constraint on the contracts of others.
136. Other moves are certainly possible, but they require abandoning both “market rationality” and
conventional symmetry lines. See Marija Bartl, Internal Market Rationality, Private Law and the Direction of
the Union: Resuscitating the Market as the Object of the Political, 21 Eur. L.J. 572, 579–83 (2015).
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A second lesson to be drawn from private law theory is that the choice to
either expand or rein in the privilege to inflict negative externalities in trade
law shall depend on larger issues of global justice. Typical of the literature
discussed in this part, on both sides of the Atlantic and across different
epochs, is an acute awareness of the distributive work that both types of
moves (more or less autonomy) regularly perform.137 Contemporary law and
economics scholars echo the basic realist insight that “[l]aw is present when-
ever gains are distributed, facilitating their aggregation or ensuring their
dispersion.”138 Given the fact that the base-line allocation of resources is not
symmetrical, allowing all players to have access to the same moves may lead
not just to the triumph of corrective justice, but to a private law system of
distribution that is distinctly and emphatically regressive. As discussed in
Section II.A above, the negative externalities stemming from the agreement
of others—say, from a yellow-dog contract or from concerted workers’ pick-
eting—are very different and may carry opposite distributive consequences.
Equipping an employee with a remedy in tort against the agreement of two
insurance companies, as per Sraffa’s example, is politically and philosoph-
ically at odds with granting (as per Vegelhan’s majority) an injunction against
picketing. While symmetrically allocated, the possibility to constrain
others’ autonomy in one case and in the other serves divergent interests and
values. The flatly symmetrical application of private law rules to all players
is therefore not a recipe for justice—not even, as suggested by Smits, for
corrective justice alone.139
These lessons carry much weight for the analysis that follows. In the
world of trade regulation, where the possibility of entering preferential
agreements is in principle open to all states, authors confronting the ques-
tion of negative externalities run the risk of absorbing, unreflexively, the
private law presumption of symmetry among market players. It is neither
plausible nor commendable to discuss the availability of remedies against an
RTA’s negative externalities as if it were a matter of doctrinal clarity, logic,
and systemic coherence. Private law moves—more autonomy to states in
some cases, less autonomy in others—cannot be devised in the abstract and
made available to all just because they can be “found” in the existing trade
law regime. Trade law, like the private law of local markets, is part and
parcel of the machinery through which allocation and distribution occur.
137. See, e.g., Robert L. Hale, Bargaining, Duress, and Economic Liberty, 43 Colum. L. Rev. 603,
603–07 (1943); David Kennedy, A World of Struggle: How Power, Law, and Expertise Shape
Global Political Economy 171–72 (2016).
138. Kennedy, supra note 137, at 204; see also Lee Anne Fennell & Richard H. McAdams, The R
Distributive Deficit in Law and Economics, 100 Minn. L. Rev. 1051, 1114–16 (2016) (contesting the claim
that tax-and-transfer is superior, as a welfare enhancing mechanism, to rules that aim to achieve distribu-
tive fairness, as opposed to sheer efficiency: “an efficient legal rule may produce an enduring distributive
deficit that is more costly in welfare terms than a less efficient rule that generates better distribution”).
139. Smits, supra note 22, at 237. The work of Hanoch Dagan articulates most effectively the conver- R
gence—indeed the inseparability—of corrective and distributive strands in private law adjudication. See
Hanoch Dagan, The Limited Autonomy of Private Law, 56 Am. J. Comp. L. 809, 810–11 (2008).
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The lack of tax-and-transfer mechanisms of global scale makes it even more
imperative than in domestic legal systems to take stock of distributive ef-
fects when devising proper rules for redressing the negative externalities of
contracts between states.140 It is therefore essential to identify which inter-
ests, if any, the granting of more or less autonomy should serve, and to
engage in explicit discussions as to which externalities should count as ac-
tionable harm, as opposed to damnum absque injuria.
III. Megaregionals and Non-Party States
A. An Illustration: The EEC and Algeria
Had the current terminology been already in use in 1957, the EEC Treaty
would have been dubbed a megaregional trade agreement. Catalyzed by
multiple post-WWII developments,141 the Treaty of Rome established a
customs union among six sovereign nations in Europe. Like some contempo-
rary megaregionals, the EEC remained open to the accession of other Euro-
pean nations, but not to non-European countries. Algeria—then a French
colony—was technically in Africa, but due to France’s EEC membership it
found itself somehow included in the club.142 The party was short-lived.
Only five (tumultuous) years later, Algeria proclaimed its independence,
which meant automatic exit from the EEC. This sudden shift from insider to
outsider status resulted in a precipitous reduction of once flourishing ex-
ports—most notably wine. In the 1950s Algeria had been the largest ex-
porter of wine in the world. The new Community logic, however, required
boosting agriculture inside the new trade block, which in turn necessitated
140. It has been famously posited that efficiency, rather than distributive fairness, should be the goal to
be pursued in court whenever the application of a rule calls for the balancing of competing interests.
Once the size of the pie is maximized—because, say, a transaction of questionable fairness has nonethe-
less moved goods into the hands of higher-value users, or because a shift in diligence standards has
rendered costly precautions unnecessary—then a fair distribution of the “pie” can be achieved by tax-
and-transfer, allegedly a method both more robust and more precise to redress substantive inequality. See
Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell, Should Legal Rules Favor the Poor? Clarifying the Role of Legal Rules and the
Income Tax in Redistributing Income, 29 J. Legal Stud. 821, 822–25 (2000). This argument has been
extensively contested, see McAdams & Fennell, supra note 138, at 1114–16, and has not fully conquered R
the realm of common or civil law adjudication, given that distributive motives continue to surface in
judicial opinions, see, e.g., Daniela Caruso, Contract Law and Distribution in the Age of Welfare Reform, 49
Ariz. L. Rev. 665, 679 (2007), but it continues to hold sway in legal scholarship.
141. Current historiography attributes the 1950s’ start of European legal integration not only to the
political desire to intertwine the economies of the member states (most notably Germany’s) so as to make
war impossible, or to build a solid European bulwark against Soviet expansion, but also to enable and
legitimize through the EEC the continued management of member states’ colonies. See Peo Hansen &
Stefan Jonsson, Eurafrica: The Untold Story of European integration and Colonialism
1–16 (2014).
142. This meant participation in the EEC’s common market for Algerian goods, including agricul-
tural products. Algeria was never a member state, but as a territory of France it was expressly mentioned
in EEC Treaty Article 227 as part of the common market for goods. See Kalypso Nicolaı¨dis, Southern
Barbarians? A Post-Colonial Critique of EUniversalism, in Echoes of Empire: Memory, Identity and
Colonial Legacies 283, 286–87 (Kalypso Nicolaı¨dis, Berny Se`be & Gabrielle Maas eds., 2015).
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protecting EEC wine production from competitive imports. France therefore
altered its established patterns of trade with North Africa, and the EEC
rapidly erected trade barriers and regulatory obstacles to Algerian wine.143
Algeria—a predominantly Muslim country surrounded by neighbors of sim-
ilar faith—had little internal demand for wine and failed to find alternative
wine purchasers abroad. This sudden loss of market share, coupled with the
realization that the wine industry had always been—symbolically and at
law—a purely French creation, led to the complete abandonment of Alge-
rian wineries. Visually, the change was stunning. One can still find 1950s’
posters depicting thousands of wine barrels ready to be shipped from Alge-
rian ports to Europe. Within a decade, however, that picture would be re-
placed by sights of uprooted vineyards and deserted cellars.144
The 1960s dismantlement of Algeria’s wine trade was good news for
Southern Italy, which had comparable weather conditions, plenty of vine-
yards, and much to gain from the elimination of barriers on their wine ex-
ports within the EEC. In a Eurocentric perspective, facilitating agricultural
expansion in post-WWII Italy was a matter of fairness in North-South rela-
tions.145 Tackling the “Southern Question” (la questione meridionale)146 re-
quired moving wealth around, and it was clear that the Common
Commercial Policy of the newly established Community would have to pro-
tect southern European markets from foreign competitors. The impoverish-
ment of Algerian agriculture served more or less directly the goals of an
internally progressive European agenda.
The Algerian story just outlined is not only an early illustration of trade
diversion resulting from a megaregional. Even more relevant here is the dis-
tributive complexity of its background. The founding fathers of the EEC
were institutionally bound to boost trade inside the Common Market. It was
not at all in their interest, however, to ruin Algerian export prospects. If
anything, they would have had an interest in sustaining the Maghrebi econ-
omy, not least because, were the African continent to realize its yet under-
tapped mineral wealth, it would become a great market for European ex-
ports.147 Indeed, the Evian Accords of 1962 were followed by a complex
143. An EEC Regulation designed to launch a Common Wine Policy also determined that bottles
identified as EEC products could not contain wine of non-EEC origin. Council Regulation 816/70, art.
26, 1970 O.J. (L 99) 1; see Jeffrey A. Munsie, A Brief History of the International Regulation of Wine
Production (2002), http://nrs.harvard.edu/urn-3:HUL.InstRepos:8944668.
144. Giulia Meloni & Johan Swinnen, The Rise and Fall of the World’s Largest Wine Exporter (and its
Institutional Legacy) (Am. Ass’n of Wine Economists, Working Paper No. 134, 2013), http://www.wine-
economics.org/aawe/wp-content/uploads/2013/02/AAWE_WP134.pdf; see also Keith Sutton, Algeria’s
Vineyards: An Islamic Dilemma and a Problem of Decolonization, 1 J. Wine Research 101, 113–15 (1990)
(noting how “culturally inappropriate” the wine industry was in Algeria).
145. See Pier Paolo D’Attorre, Italian Reconstruction and “Depressed Areas”: The Marshall Plan in the
“Mezzogiorno” (Ctr. for Eur. Stud., Working Paper No. 11, 1987), http://www.ces.fas.harvard.edu/publi-
cations/docs/pdfs/CES_11.pdf.
146. See Nelson J. Moe, The View from Vesuvius: Italian Culture and the Southern Ques-
tion 1–2 (2006).
147. Hansen & Jonsson, supra note 141, at 125–28. R
\\jciprod01\productn\H\HLI\59-2\HLI202.txt unknown Seq: 32 21-JUN-18 12:18
420 Harvard International Law Journal / Vol. 59
network of agreements (between Algiers on one side and Paris or Brussels on
the other) aimed at maintaining or reinstating trade channels and prefer-
ences.148 Shoring up Algeria’s economy in the aftermath of independence
would then be a “recognized interest” for Bagchi or, per Smits’ aforemen-
tioned construct, a “value” in the ethos of post-colonial Europe.
The Algerian example sets, therefore, the stage for the inquiry that fol-
lows: how does the trade law system protect non-parties whose interests are
harmed by a megaregional? Should the law give them agency to protect
their prerogatives, especially when megaregional parties are, for whatever
reason, also invested in the welfare of non-parties?
As noted earlier in Secion I.A, there is by now a large body of literature,
in law as in economics, pointing out that RTAs may negatively interfere
with the general goals of multilateralism. Until recently, not much had in-
stead been said about the harm that RTAs may inflict on specific non-par-
ties—in Bagchi’s language, about concentrated externalities.149 This gap is
now filling up. Prominent trade law scholars have been concerned with the
possibility that countries in dire economic straits find themselves shut out of
once promising lines of export due to the mushrooming of new RTAs
among other countries.150 This vein of scholarship partakes, in many ways,
of the same themes and conceptual hurdles faced in private law theory by
Smits, Bagchi, and Porat, but it strives to find avenues for non-parties’ pro-
tection within the special toolkit of WTO law and international law
doctrines.
As already observed, a few avenues for non-parties’ redress exist and, mir-
roring private-law taxonomies, come in two broad types: expansion of auton-
omy on one hand, and the legal policing of its limits on the other.151 Non-
parties, if harmed by trade deals entered by other nations, can in principle
turn to forming RTAs of their own.152 Alternatively, an aggrieved non-party
can attempt to constrain the reach of the RTA entered into by other nations
to its detriment. Sections III.B and III.C below discuss various legal tech-
niques used to limit the scope and reach of RTAs when they inflict negative
externalities on non-parties. Section III.D, drawing insight from Part II,
148. “Even with the signing of the [Evian] Accords on 19 March 1962, Algeria’s relationship with
France and, by extension, with the European Community was not clear. Although Title II of the Evian
Accords specified the institution of preferential tariffs and the maintenance of trade flows to France of
Algerian products, it was not until the 1970s that Algiers and Brussels formalized the relationship.”
Gregory White, A Comparative Political Economy of Tunisia and Morocco 52 (2001). EU-
Maghrebi relations were characterized by association agreements, now evolving into cooperation agree-
ments. See Adel Abdel Ghafar, Toward a Recalibration of EU-North Africa Relations (Brookings Inst. 2017),
https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2017/05/paper_toward-a-recalibration_english_web_fi
nal3.pdf.
149. Bagchi, supra note 21, at 219. R
150. Most notably Klabbers, supra note 17, and Howse, supra note 20. R
151. See supra Section II.D.
152. See infra notes 193–195 and accompanying text. R
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subjects such legal techniques to critical scrutiny, and concludes that the
problem with each of these mechanisms lies in their distributive neutrality.
B. RTA Formation as “Breach of Contract”: Violation of Article XXIV or
Breach of the Enabling Clause
In private law, one straightforward way to complain about contracts to
the detriment of others is to characterize the impugned agreement as a
breach of pre-existing contractual obligations. In stylized form: C could sue
A for entering into a contract with B, if a prior agreement between C and A
prohibited, more or less explicitly, the contract that A and B would later
enter into. The ordinary enforcement of non-compete clauses in employment
contracts exemplifies this move. Transposed onto the landscape of WTO
law, C’s plea would consist of the argument that the free trade agreement
reached by A and B is not within the scope of either GATT Article XXIV or
the 1979 Enabling Clause—the two main enablers of preferential arrange-
ments between sub-groups of contracting parties—and is therefore in breach
of the contractual obligations stemming from the baseline multilateral re-
gime. This has been the subject of several WTO disputes,153 two of which—
Turkey—Textiles154 and EC—Tariff Preferences (GSP)155—stand out as partic-
ularly effective examples. India—a rapidly emerging economy—happened
to be the initiator of both cases.156
In the mid-1990s India was opening up its markets and experiencing an
unprecedented rate of growth. It was in this context of aggressive liberaliza-
tion that the Indian government decided to initiate a WTO complaint
against Turkey’s reinstatement of quotas on Indian textiles. In turn, Turkey
invoked the privilege of entering a customs union with the EC, which—it
alleged— required and justified the renewed textile quota.157 The dispute
ended with a decision by the Appellate Body (“AB”) which famously
hinged on the concept of necessity: while Turkey was indeed privileged to
enter a customs union, the privilege only encompassed activities that were
strictly necessary to the livelihood of the Turkey-EC deal. The AB’s report
153. “Since 1994, the DSU has dealt with at least 13 cases in which the existence of an RTA has been
pleaded or argued in one way or another.” Armand C.M. de Mestral, Dispute Settlement under the WTO and
RTAs: An Uneasy Relationship, 16 J. Int’l Econ. L. 777, 789 (2013).
154. Appellate Body Report, Turkey—Restrictions on Imports of Textile and Clothing Products, WTO Doc.
WT/DS34/AB/R (adopted Oct. 22, 1999) [hereinafter Turkey—Textiles].
155. Panel Report, European Communities—Conditions for the Granting of Tariff Preferences to Developing
Countries, WTO Doc. WT/DS/246/R (adopted Dec. 1, 2003) [hereinafter EC—Tariff Preferences (GSP)].
156. See Biswajit Dhar & Abhik Majumdar, Learning from the India-EC GSP Dispute: The Issues and the
Process, in Dispute Settlement at the WTO: The Developing Country Experience 174, 176
(Gregory C. Shaffer & Ricardo Mele´ndez-Ortiz eds., 2010).
157. The EC allegedly required that Turkey reinstate quotas on Indian textiles to avoid the result of
Indian products flooding the EC market through the backdoor of Turkey. The AB found that rules of
origin, clearly distinguishing between Turkey’s own products and merchandise imported from India,
would provide sufficient protection to the EC textiles market. The AB therefore ruled the Turkish quota
unnecessary. EC—Tariff Preferences (GSP), supra note 155, ¶ 190(e). R
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did what it could to pin down the shifty requirement of necessity and to
heighten the bar of legality in Article XXIV.158 India prevailed.
Again in 2002, India filed a WTO complaint against the EC, this time
denouncing Brussels for granting special preferences to twelve developing
countries (including Pakistan) in exchange for their collaboration in the
fight against international drug trafficking.159 The Indian government felt
unduly left out and discriminated by such special preferences, which hurt its
textile market share by giving a boost to Pakistani exports.160 This plight
also found sympathetic ears in Geneva: the AB clarified that the granting of
special preferences towards developing countries must respect fixed parame-
ters of legality, such as non-discrimination among similarly situated benefi-
ciaries.161 India prevailed again.
This double victory drives home the following point: the privilege to
enter treaties that depart from the multilateral mold, through either the
Enabling Clause or the Article XXIV exception, is not unqualified. Pacta
nocent and, like private law, trade law makes room for remedies in favor of
harmed non-parties. Rob Howse adds strength to this argument by further
narrowing the scope of Article XXIV.162 He argues that this authorization
to enter non-MFN deals is quite broad only with regard to special tariff
concessions. By contrast, for non-tariff obstacles to trade such as product
requirements, the scope for entering special deals is much narrower: the
technical barriers to trade (“TBT”)163 or the sanitary and phytosanitary
(“SPS”) measures164 do not make exceptions for RTAs. This means, for in-
stance, that an agreement reducing such non-tariff barriers as technical or
sanitary product requirements exclusively within a given group of countries
could be invoked, on MFN grounds, by other WTO parties that have been
left behind.165 This argument for the enhancement of non-parties’ protection
has been endorsed as “cogent” and “subtle” by Jan Klabbers.166
Klabbers develops analogous moves at the level of general international
law. He starts from the assumption that trade agreements are ordinary trea-
ties, therefore subject to the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties
158. See Joost Pauwelyn, The Puzzle of WTO Safeguards and Regional Trade Agreements, 7 J. Int’l Econ.
L. 109, 141 (2004) (critiquing the AB).
159. EC—Tariff Preferences (GSP), supra note 155, ¶ 3. R
160. Dhar & Majumdar, supra note 156, at 176. R
161. EC—Tariff Preferences (GSP), supra note 155, ¶¶ 142–43. R
162. Howse, supra note 20, at 138, 142. R
163. Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing
the World Trade Organization, Annex 1A, 1868 U.N.T.S. 120 [hereinafter TBT].
164. Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures, Apr. 15, 1994, Mar-
rakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1A, 1867 U.N.T.S. 493 [hereinaf-
ter SPS].
165. Lorand Bartels, The Legality of the EC Mutual Recognition Clause under WTO Law, 8 J. Int’l Econ.
L. 691, 703 (2005) (arguing the mutual recognition clauses in EU member states’ legislation, aimed to
facilitate Turkey and EFTA countries’ exports to the EU, might be invoked by third countries on the
basis of the TBT’s non-discrimination obligation).
166. Klabbers, supra note 17, at 3. R
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(“VCLT”) and to other international law norms. Klabbers notes that inter-
national law rules on treaty succession can be invoked in this context.167 He
points out that the norms on inter se treaty modification can be relevant
whenever the original deal was signed by A, B, and C, and the second one (a
preferential trade agreement) only by A and B.168 Accordingly, he posits
that C might find solace in such norms and seek remedies in proper fora.169
In support of his argument, Klabbers also refers to EU law and finds in the
Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (“TFEU”) fodder for non-
parties’ remedial action.170
Klabbers himself acknowledges, however, that such avenues of redress
may be impervious.171 The unabated proliferation of RTAs in the 21st cen-
tury shows how difficult it is to halt, in the name of textual strictures in the
GATT, any given sub-group of WTO members from entering exclusive
deals to the detriment of others. As demonstrated by the paucity of success-
ful challenges to the legality of RTAs, proving a violation—or a “breach”—
is hard. Alternative avenues, assuming no violation of any WTO rule but
only privileged conduct, may be more promising.
C. RTA Formation as “Tort”: Non-Violation Nullification or Impairment
Provision of GATT Article XXIII
Contrary to other GATT provisions, Article XXIII:1(b) has remained in
force since 1947 and has even been cloned, with minimal changes, in other
WTO agreements.172 This provision concerns the possibility of a trade rem-
edy for state C when two other states—A and B—have not violated any
particular GATT articles, yet have taken “measures” which have “impaired
or nullified” the benefits that C expected from the GATT trade regime.173
167. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 41, May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 332.
168. Klabbers, supra note 17, at 6; see also William A. Kerr et al., Conflicting Rules for the International R
Trade of GM Products: Does International Law Provide a Solution? 17 AgBioForum 105, 106 (2014) (con-
sidering the role of VCLT Article 30 in the context of successive WTO and non-WTO agreements with
different parties).
169. Klabbers, supra note 17, at 6. R
170. Id. at 5 n.8 (“[TFEU] Article 351 is generally seen as protecting the rights of third parties under
treaties concluded with EU member states prior to the creation of the EU or its entry into force for those
who acceded later. While the provision does not always work to the benefit of third parties (the Court of
Justice of the European Union has been creative in finding ways to leave it without application), at least
it does suggest that some kind of third party protection is not impossible.”).
171. Klabbers, supra note 17, at 8. R
172. Cf. Frieder Roessler, Should Principles of Competition Policy Be Incorporated into WTO Law through
Non-Violation Complaints?, 2 J. Int’l Econ. L. 413, 415 (1999) (“Most of the WTO Agreements contain
a provision that [references] Article XXIII . . . .”).
173. GATT Article XXIII:1 recites:
If any contracting party should consider that any benefit accruing to it directly or indirectly
under this Agreement is being nullified or impaired or that the attainment of any objective of
the Agreement is being impeded as the result of . . .
(b) the application by another contracting party of any measure, whether or not it conflicts
with the provisions of this Agreement, or
(c) the existence of any other situation,
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The word “measure” might seem to refer exclusively to states’ unilateral
policies; yet it appears capacious enough as to include the act of entering
new trade deals with other parties.174 Indeed, in a few cases, Article XX-
III:1(b) has been successfully invoked by a non-party to challenge respon-
dent states’ accession to a new trade agreement.175 Forming an RTA is a
privileged activity and cannot be considered a violation of any GATT rule;
yet, just like the contracts between A and B discussed in Part II, the RTA
may result in the nullification or impairment of C’s expectations stemming
from pre-existing trade equilibria. If that is the case, the nullification or
impairment ceases to be mere damnum absque injuria, and instead justifies C’s
recourse to dispute resolution.176
The Citrus dispute is a well-known application of GATT Article XX-
III.177 In 1982 the United States asked that a GATT panel be convened. The
complaint alleged that the EEC had caused the nullification or impairment
of certain benefits from trade in fresh lemons and oranges that the United
States had come to expect on the basis of the EEC’s bound tariffs on citrus
fruit.178 To the United States’ dismay, the EEC had recently granted prefer-
ential treatment to a number of Mediterranean countries: not only Spain and
Malta, destined to accede the Community at some future point, but also
north-African states with which the EEC had recently negotiated special
partnerships in the context of a broader geopolitical strategy for the Medi-
terranean basin.179 The panel never determined whether the impugned pref-
erences met the requisites for GATT legality, and therefore was unable to
identify any “violation,” but it found that the competitiveness of U.S. citrus
the contracting party may [resort to dispute settlement]. General Agreement on Tariffs and
Trade 1994 art. XXIII:1, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade
Organization, Annex 1A, 1867 U.N.T.S. 187, 33 I.L.M. 1153 (1994).
Professor Klabbers does not refer to Article XXIII:1(b), see supra note 17, but his reference to the objec- R
tive regime doctrine of international law seems to partake of the same logic: if the trade equilibrium
resulting through WTO multilateral negotiations at any given point in time can be considered an “ob-
jective regime,” then—Klabbers suggests—non-parties can complain against new RTAs that have upset
their competitive status, see supra note 17, at 6. R
174. Especially if read in conjunction with Article XXIII:1(c).
175. See, e.g., Report of the Panel, European Community—Tariff Treatment on Imports of Citrus Products
from Certain Countries in the Mediterranean Region, L/5776 (Feb. 7, 1985) [hereinafter Citrus].
176. As noted in Panel Report, Japan—Measures Affecting Consumer Photographic Film and Paper, WTO
Doc. WT/DS44/R (adopted Mar. 31, 1998) [hereinafter Japan—Film], non-violation claims are “excep-
tional.” The general rule—one can infer—is that any trade policy which is not in conflict with GATT/
WTO provisions is a privileged activity.
177. Citrus, supra note 175, at 84. R
178. Robert E. Hudec, Enforcing International Trade Law: The Evolution of the Mod-
ern GATT Legal System 157–61 (1993).
179. Rosine M. Plank-Brumback, GATT Dispute Settlement Practices: Setting the Stage for Reform, in A
History of Law and Lawyers in the GATT/WTO: The Development of the Rule of Law in
the Multilateral Trading System 151, 154 (Gabrielle Marceau & Roberto Azeveˆdo eds., 2015). The
EEC had also enacted preferential regimes with other states, members of the 1975 Lome´ Convention, but
such regimes were clearly driven by widely shared development goals and the United States did not
include them in its complaint. Id.
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fruit in the European market had suffered and that remedies were
warranted.180
Several authors, relying on various GATT panel reports,181 have described
the non-violation provision as a trade-law equivalent of the good faith obli-
gation that binds the parties to a contract—not just those who negotiated a
particular trade concession, but also everyone else in a multilateral dimen-
sion.182 At a closer look, however, the provision seems rather analogous to
the tort of interference with legitimate business expectations, discussed ear-
lier in Part II. This is because the complainant does not base its claim upon
a bilateral, privity relation with a particular contracting party, as would be
the case in a breach-of-good-faith suit, but rather upon general trade condi-
tions pre-dating the respondent’s conduct. Moreover, the finding of impair-
ment does not depend on establishing a specific loss of trade, but can instead
be based on proof of “an abstract adverse change in competition.”183 The
complainant (C) cannot ask that the respondent state(s) (A and/or B) discon-
tinue or withdraw the measure,184 but it can demand compensation—a fea-
ture that further corroborates the analogy with private-law liability rules.
Seen through the lens of private law, this provision seems strikingly analo-
gous to the rules addressing the harm to non-parties resulting from other
people’s contracts.
The private law tort of interference with prospective business relations
(discussed in Part II) and the trade law claim of non-violation have a lot in
common. First, in both cases, the conduct of the defendant (or respondent
state) is on its face legal—a Hohfeldian privilege, if not a right. Second,
both are premised on the assumption that pre-existing arrangements be-
tween two parties should sometimes be protected against the interference of
other actors. In WTO law, the non-violation claim allows for protection of
“legitimate expectations” stemming from a prior arrangement (say, from
MFN-based tariffs concessions). Third, and most important, both the cause
of action of tortious interference with business prospects and the non-viola-
180. Id. at 158. The panel report was not adopted due to the EEC’s opposition. After a series of
retaliatory measures, the parties eventually settled the dispute.
181. In Panel Report, Korea—Measures Affecting Government Procurement, ¶ 7.93, WTO Doc. WT/
DS163/R (adopted May 1, 2000), the panel linked Article XXIII to the customary international law
principle that treaties must be performed in good faith and quoted Article 26 of the Vienna Convention:
“Every treaty . . . must be performed by [the parties] in good faith.” The panel further explained that
actions in violation of the spirit (as opposed to the letter) of prior commitments could “deny the compet-
itive opportunities which are the reasonably expected effect of such commitments.” Id. ¶ 7.99. Yet, as
noted by Robert W. Staiger & Alan O. Sykes, Non-Violations, 16 J. Int’l Econ. L. 741, 753–54 (2013),
the panels do not seem to require evidence of bad faith by non-violation complainants.
182. Marion Panizzon, Good Faith in the Jurisprudence of the WTO: The Protection of
Legitimate Expectations, Good Faith Interpretation and Fair Dispute Settlement 127–96
(2006).
183. Sung-joon Cho, GATT Non-Violation Issues in the WTO Framework: Are They the Achilles’ Heel of the
Dispute Settlement Process?, 39 Harv. Int’l L.J. 311, 318 (1998) (with reference to a somewhat analogous
dispute: Report of the Panel, Treatment by Germany of Imports of Sardines, G/26 (Oct. 31, 1952), GATT
BISD (1st Supp.), at 53 (1953)).
184. Staiger & Sykes, supra note 181, at 748. R
\\jciprod01\productn\H\HLI\59-2\HLI202.txt unknown Seq: 38 21-JUN-18 12:18
426 Harvard International Law Journal / Vol. 59
tion provision are startling oddities, because they are “superimposed on an
economic order committed to competition.”185
Just like the amorphous torts of unfair competition or interference with
business expectations, the non-violation measure has not met with universal
praise among scholars.186 Sung-joon Cho, for instance, has argued that the
non-violation provisions under the WTO dispute settlement system have
severe disadvantages, including “their inherent ambiguity and the concomi-
tant risk that they might be misused.”187 Cho characterizes the panel’s ap-
proach in the above-mentioned Citrus dispute as “lax” because it interpreted
the concept of nullification and impairment as to “also protect[ ] the
broader balance of benefits that governments had a right to expect as a result
of reciprocal undertakings . . . .”188 Cho further laments that the inherent
ambiguity of non-violation remained unaddressed through the Uruguay
Round, in spite of attempts to define the concept of ‘reasonable legitimate
expectations’ in the Brussels Draft Final Act.189 Equally skeptical remarks
on non-violation complaints are to be found among economists.190
On the other hand, scholars less interested in free trade as a dogma than
in the elasticity of trade rules and in the preservation of states’ regulatory
capacity have looked with interest at the concept of non-violation nullifica-
tion or impairment. In the aftermath of the Tuna—Dolphin disputes,191 for
instance, Howse and Trebilcock pointed to GATT Article XXIII as a wel-
come valve in the WTO system.192 A non-violation complaint—they ar-
gued—might allow for contestation of formally legitimate state practices
that trigger a race to the bottom in matters of environmental standards.193
Just like tortious interference, the notion of non-violation makes room for
considerations of social justice in otherwise coldly competitive market
regimes.
185. Harvey S. Perlman, Interference with Contract and Other Economic Expectancies: A Clash of Tort and
Contract Doctrine, 49 U. Chi. L. Rev. 61, 78 (1982).
186. See supra Section II.C, note 118 and accompanying text, referring to Connor’s and other scholarly R
critiques.
187. Cho, supra note 183, at 311. R
188. Id. at 319.
189. Id. at 320.
190. Staiger & Sykes, supra note 181, at 743 (“[T]he modest observed role played by the non-viola- R
tion doctrine over the history of the GATT/WTO system may well be appropriate, and . . . both the
drafters of GATT and inferences drawn directly from existing economic theory may have been overop-
timistic about what the doctrine can realistically accomplish.”).
191. Panel Report, United States—Restrictions on Imports of Tuna, DS21/R (Sept. 3, 1991), GATT BISD
(39th Supp.), at 155 (1993); Panel Report, United States—Restrictions on Imports of Tuna, DS29/R (June
16, 1994).
192. Robert Howse & Michael J. Trebilcock, The Fair Trade-Free Trade Debate: Trade, Labor, and the
Environment, 16 Int’l Rev. L. & Econ. 61, 78 (1996).
193. Id.
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D. Non-Party Complaints and Their Limitations
From this sketchy survey of the trade law literature on non-party com-
plaints, five points emerge. First, like their analogs in private law, the ex-
isting avenues for non-party redress remain narrow exceptions. The freedom
of contracting parties’ sub-groups to enter an RTA—even a megaregional
one—is paramount. The fact that GATT Article XXIV is cast as an excep-
tion to the rules of multilateralism is irrelevant: decades of state practice
have turned regional or bilateral preferences into a Grundnorm of the trade
game.194
Second, non-party claims are hard to adjudicate, and the difficulty of po-
licing the fuzzy borders of Article XXIV has certainly facilitated the rise of
trade regionalism. Additional uncertainty stems from the jurisdictional
overlap of the WTO’s own dispute settlement body and alternative adjudi-
catory sites set up by some RTAs.195 The parameters of the Enabling
Clause—the other major “exception” to the MFN rule—are even less firm
than the parameters of GATT Article XXIV.196 There is, as a consequence,
ample discretion to devise preferential policies towards sub-groups of devel-
oping countries, and outsiders have correspondingly narrow ways to chal-
lenge such policies. Of equally difficult justiciability are non-party claims
based on the vague words of GATT Article XXIII or on the flimsy limb of
the objective regimes doctrine.
A third important yield of the analysis conducted in this Part is the dis-
tributive ambivalence of non-party complaints when they happen to suc-
ceed. The scholarly search for non-party remedies is genuinely inspired by
the desire to offer struggling states the possibility to “contest” the regional-
ism of “the great powers.”197 A David-and-Goliath undertone characterizes
this strand of literature. But it is not at all clear that the highlighted non-
party remedies can move forward the ball of justice in international trade.
Recall India’s victory in EC—Tariff Preferences: India, a non-party vis-a`-vis
the EC’s Drugs Arrangements, risked a competitive setback on the world
textile market; it therefore summoned the WTO Dispute Settlement Body
(DSB) and managed to prevail. But was this strategy in any way related to
global justice? India’s victory resulted in economic harm for Pakistan—a
194. See de Mestral, supra note 153, at 784–85. R
195. See Songling Yang, The Solution for Jurisdictional Conflicts Between the WTO and RTAs: The Forum
Choice Clause, 23 Mich. St. Int’l L. Rev. 107, 109 (2014); Jennifer Hillman, Conflicts Between Dispute
Settlement Mechanisms in Regional Trade Agreements and the WTO—What Should the WTO Do?, 42 Cornell
Int’l L.J. 193, 202 (2009).
196. Appellate Body Report, European Communities—Conditions for the Granting of Tariff Preferences to
Developing Countries, ¶ 173, WTO Doc. WT/DS246/AB/R (adopted Apr. 7, 2004) (“[W]e conclude that
the term ‘non-discriminatory’ in footnote 3 does not prohibit developed-country Members from granting different
tariffs to products originating in different GSP beneficiaries, provided that such differential tariff treatment
meets the remaining conditions in the Enabling Clause.” (emphasis added)).
197. Klabbers’s concern for world inequality is explicit: “[I]nternational law is not completely silent
when it comes to the activities of the great powers, and offers something of a vocabulary for contestation,
however embryonic and tentative.” Supra note 17, at 8. R
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state that struggled to expand its share in a market for textiles dominated by
giants such as China and, indeed, India itself. From the viewpoint of Pakis-
tani exporters, the equities of India’s WTO victory must have seemed ques-
tionable at best.198 Like the private cause of action for interference in the
hands of Lumley, which ultimately lessened the economic power of Ms.
Wagner, the avenues for non-party redress that one can find within the
WTO or international law architecture have no clear distributive vector and
may corroborate, rather than correct, baseline inequalities.
The fourth point of note has to do with the extreme difficulty of identify-
ing (and agreeing upon) desirable distributive outcomes in trade law. Recall
the drama of Algerian vineyards in the aftermath of independence. Recall, as
well, Italy’s struggle to conquer the international wine market. The EEC’s
tough stance towards imports from North Africa in the 1960s was a re-
sponse to the plea voiced by Italian delegates during the negotiation of the
EEC Treaty.199 And indeed, in the short term, Italy’s exports benefited from
the decline of Algerian viticulture. With time, however, new difficulties
have emerged. The irony of the present day is that the predicaments of the
Maghreb and the Sahel are part and parcel of the socio-economic troubles of
Italy’s south. Dwindling agricultural exports undermine economic diversifi-
cation in North Africa and contribute to the region’s political instability.200
The ensuing social strife prompts large numbers of migrants to venture
across the Mediterranean and leads to unspeakable tragedies right at the
doorsteps of Europe.201 Especially at times of sovereign debt crises in South-
ern Europe, the reception of migrants further complicates financial and po-
litical equations.202 Beggar-thy-neighbor policies, like wine trade
protectionism in early EEC life, can easily backfire in the current geopoliti-
cal context.
A fifth takeaway from the foregoing inquiry is that the protection of non-
parties raises crucial issues of institutional competence. In the abstract, the
possibility of prevailing before the DSB might allow a non-party to force
changes upon the structure of a harmful RTA or PTA (as India did in Tur-
key—Textiles and EC—Tariff Preferences), or to negotiate reparations for trade
injuries received, or to engage in retaliatory conduct with Geneva’s blessing.
198. Dhar & Majumdar, supra note 156, at 177 (noting that the Pakistani share of the world textile R
market was “not very significant” at the time of the EC—Tariff Preferences (GSP) dispute).
199. Hansen & Jonsson, supra note 141, at 227–28. R
200. See Daniela Caruso & Joanna Geneve, Trade and History: The Case of EU-Algeria Relations, 33 B.U.
Int’l L.J. (2015), http://www.bu.edu/ilj/category/eu-algeria-trade/.
201. Efam Awo Dovi, Migration: Taking Rickety Boats to Europe, Africa Renewal Online (Feb. 23,
2017), http://www.un.org/africarenewal/magazine/special-edition-youth-2017/migration-taking-rickety-
boats-europe.
202. See Alessandra Corrado, Clandestini in the Orange Towns: Migrations and Racisms in Calabria’s Agri-
culture, 4 Race/Ethnicity: Multidisciplinary Global Contexts 191, 197 (2011) (recounting riots
between locals and immigrants in the southern Italian town of Rosarno); Mark Langan, The Moral Econ-
omy of EU Relations with North African States: DCFTAs Under the European Neighbourhood Policy, 36 Third
World Q. 1827, 1828 (2015) (highlighting the EU’s interest in “creating jobs for young North Afri-
cans who otherwise might be drawn into migration or, worse, into radicalisation”).
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But given the fragile equilibrium of multilateral, regional, and bilateral
deals, and in light of the political salience of development issues, the DSB
may very well not be the appropriate arbiter of RTAs’ and PTAs’ legality.
The closing remarks that follow are devoted to this issue.
Conclusion
The search for non-party remedies against the negative externalities of
trade agreements yields a handful of doctrinal moves and occasionally justi-
ciable claims. It is indeed possible, in theory, to entrust the protection of
non-parties to international arbitration panels (within and perhaps also
without the dispute settlement system of the WTO). This is indeed already
the case to a modest extent, but the current scholarly emphasis on the need
to protect non-parties from megaregionals would give more prominence to
their pleas. Summoned more forcefully by emboldened non-parties, arbitra-
tors might more frequently find that the impugned trade agreement violates
prior contractual commitments or that it alters settled equilibria and expec-
tations. The now slim strand of jurisprudence concerning the claims of non-
parties would expand. New regional or bilateral agreements would be bar-
gained for in the shadow of this growing body of law, and the very likeli-
hood of non-parties’ recourse might induce parties to minimize the negative
externalities of their deals.
The problem with this scenario is the super-imposition of a premodern
private law culture onto a postmodern world trade reality. Because the en-
visaged trade law game would be premised on the symmetry of all players,
the same remedies would be available to non-parties of all kinds—small and
large economies, most and least developed countries. Like civil- or common-
law courts in the early twentieth-century, panels would be expected to eval-
uate each claim discretely and to remain insensitive to broader questions of
justice. But when any party C can prevent A and B from entering the deal
they would like, justice is not necessarily served: Lumley—an already
stronger party—goes to court to keep Ms. Wagner from growing more com-
petitive; the factory owner gets to enjoin the concerted action of his employ-
ees; India keeps Pakistani textiles from conquering Western markets; and so
on.
By the same token, in a scenario characterized by distributively neutral
non-party remedies, every player would retain the same degree of autonomy
and would freely enter bilateral or regional deals with selected playmates. To
be sure, this might be wonderful. In the spirit of Holmes’s Vegelhan dissent,
developing countries would perhaps respond to the rise of megaregionals by
entering additional trade deals. Africa would at last de-balkanize.203 South-
203. Patrick N. Osakwe & Karl Vohlmuth, Towards Transformative Regional Integration in Africa – An
Introduction, in Achim Gutowski et al., Africa’s Progress in Regional and Global Economic Integration—To-
wards Transformative Regional Integration, 18 Afr. Dev. Persp. Y.B. 3, 4 (2015/16) (positing that
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South allegiances would strengthen, like early labor unions in the 1900s.204
And because autonomy means just that—the ability to make one’s own
rules, if necessary by means of contracts—clusters of fragile economies
would be able to design their own special forms of integration, rather than
adopting RTA models based on inapplicable legal and political
assumptions.205
But once again private law lends us a cautionary tale. If all A and B
parties have the same degree of contractual freedom, then we may have no
way to stop cartels of “haves” from forming, and from crowding out the
market opportunities of the “have-nots.” It is worth noting that the con-
temporary favor for RTAs in the international sphere mirrors the favorable
view of international cartels in 1920s Europe. Cartels were then perceived as
a means of rationalizing the world economy and even preventing world con-
flicts. Only with time did Europe come to realize the cartels’ less than be-
nign impacts on their respective markets.206 A free-for-all, neoliberal
embrace of bilateralism or regionalism might exacerbate global wealth
asymmetries rather than cure them. The level of synergy that the megare-
gionals of advanced economies could bring about could never be matched by
parallel allegiances among developing countries. The question of global ine-
quality requires stronger commitments to redistribution than the ones con-
templated in current trade law.
Like the legal realists of a century ago, we must pursue the opportunities
for greater justice that may stem from the presumed symmetry of all players
on a level playfield. But we must also be swift to recognize when the ball of
justice is simply stuck. If that is the case, moving that ball forward requires
tilting the table. Private law theory is most useful when it lets us see with
clarity the limits of a private law game. When transposed onto the field of
international trade, private law theory sheds welcome light on the need for
explicit distributive commitments and on the limits of the legal method in
our quest for justice.
“[r]egional integration can foster structural transformation in Africa”). CFTA is at present the most
ambitious regionalization project for Africa. See CFTA—Continental Free Trade Area, Afr. Union, https://
au.int/en/ti/cfta/about (last visited Aug. 1, 2017).
204. James Thuo Gathii, African Regional Trade Agreements as Legal Regimes 414–23
(2011) (discussing South-South trade as a possible survival strategy for developing countries). For recent
scholarly encouragement towards regionalism in the Global South see, for example, Dan Ciuriak, India’s
Possible Response to the Challenge of the Mega-Regionals, Conference Paper at Changing Global Economic
Scenario: Implications for India’s Trade Policy and Make in India Programme, New Delhi, India (May
12, 2015), http://ssrn.com/abstract=2606720, and Ron Sandrey, Mega-Regional Trade Agreements and
South Africa’s Trade Strategy: Implications for the Tripartite Free Trade Area Negotiations (SAIIA, Occasional
Paper No. 195, 2014).
205. See Gathii, supra note 204, at 8–15 (emphasizing the inapplicability of neo-liberal assumptions R
to the context of African trade regionalism).
206. David Gerber, Global Competition: Law, Markets, and Globalization 27–28 (2010).
